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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis investigated the importance of semantics in generating 
inferences during discourse processing. Three aspects of semantics, gender 
stereotypes, implicit causality information and proto-role properties, were used to 
investigate whether semantics is activated elaboratively during discourse 
comprehension and what its relative importance is in backward inferencing compared 
to discourse/structural cues. Visual world eye-tracking studies revealed that semantics 
plays an important role in both backward and forward inferencing: Gender 
stereotypes and implicit causality information is activated elaboratively during online 
discourse comprehension. Moreover, gender stereotypes, implicit causality and proto-
role properties of verbs are all used in backward inferencing. Importantly, the studies 
demonstrated that semantic cues are weighed against discourse/structural cues. When 
the structural cues consist of a combination of cues that have been independently 
shown to be important in backward inferencing, semantic effects may be masked, 
whereas when the structural cues consist of a combination of fewer prominent cues, 
semantics can have an earlier effect than structural factors in pronoun resolution. In 
addition, the type of inference matters, too: During anaphoric inferencing semantics 
has a prominent role, while discourse/structural salience attains more prominence 
during non-anaphoric inferencing. Finally, semantics exhibits a strong role in inviting 
new inferences to revise earlier made inferences even in the case the additional 
inference is not needed to establish coherence in discourse. The findings are generally 
in line with the Mental Model approaches. Two extended model versions are 
presented that incorporate the current findings into the earlier literature. These models 
allow both forward and backward inferencing to occur at any given moment during 
the course of processing; they also allow semantic and discourse/structural cues to 
contribute to both of these processes. However, while Mental Model 1 does not 
assume interactions between semantic and discourse/structural factors in forward 
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The important question of how people manage to comprehend language quickly 
and effortlessly has attracted psycholinguists for a long time. It is commonly known 
that language comprehension does not only involve extracting the literal meaning of 
words in the text, but also involves drawing different types of inferences based on 
information that is not literally stated in the text (e.g., Clark, 1977; Haviland & Clark, 
1974; Garnham, 2001). However, despite decades of research, there is still no clear 
consensus on what kinds of inferences are drawn during online language 
comprehension and how different factors contribute to and compete with each other 
during inference generation. Importantly, the current theories have failed to capture 
the relative importance of semantics compared to discourse/structural cues during 
inferencing and anaphoric processing. Limitations of the previously used methods 
may partly explain why these questions have remained unresolved.  
In the research conducted for this thesis, I took advantage of a tight temporal 
coupling between spoken language comprehension and people’s visual attention to 
scenes related to the sentences that they hear. I used visual world eye-tracking, that 
involves measuring listeners’ eye movements to visually depicted pictorial stimuli 
while they are listening to spoken language, as a method to study what kinds of 
inferences are drawn online and how strong the effect of semantics is during 
inferential and anaphoric processes. I studied three dimensions of semantics: gender 
stereotypes, implicit causality and protoroles. Based on my findings, I argue that the 
language processor does not only operate in an optimal way by allowing both forward 
and backward inferencing at any given moment during the course of processing, but 
also weighs semantic and discourse/structural cues in such a dynamic way that has 
remained unexplained in current theories of inferencing. 
The thesis consists of four original journal articles. In this overview, I set the 
research questions investigated in those studies in a wider theoretical context than 
was done in the original publications. Therefore, I will provide an extensive 
discussion of previous experimental literature on gender stereotypes, implicit 
causality and protoroles. In addition, I will review the experimental methods used in 
earlier studies of inferences and suggest reasons why these methods have failed to 
provide evidence for the hypotheses proposed by the current theories or have failed to 
disentangle competing hypotheses. Finally, after reviewing all four studies, I highlight 
what was learned about the importance of semantics during online inferencing and 
anaphor resolution, and what kinds of aspects should be taken into account when 
extending or revising the current processing theories. Finally, I propose two extended 
mental models to explain inference generation during online processing.  
 
1.1 Bridging and elaborative inferences in discourse 
In language comprehension, the definition of the term inference that is adopted in 
this thesis is a process in which a comprehender encodes information that is not 
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explicitly stated in the text (e.g. Clark, 1977; Haviland & Clark, 1974; McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1989; Potts, Keenan, & Golding, 1988). Inferences can be divided into two 
groups based on the direction they are drawn during comprehension: bridging 
inferences are made in backward fashion while elaborative inferences are made in 
forward fashion (Clark, 1977; Clark & Haviland, 1977). For example, when people hear 
a pronoun he referring back to the earlier mentioned character in (1), the referent is 
assigned in backward fashion. Pronouns are one type of anaphors: the term anaphora 
refers to a relationship in which two linguistic elements refer to the same concept and 
the interpretation of one concept (an anaphor) is determined by the interpretation of the 
other concept (an antecedent) (e.g., Wasow, 1986). Thus, in example (1) the pronoun 
he and its antecedent chimney sweep refer to the same entity in a real world.  
 
 (1) The chimney sweep was climing onto the roof. He was worried whether 
it could be slippery.  
 
Even though pronouns and anaphors in general are typical examples and the most 
widely studied types of bridging inferences, people also make inferences in backward 
fashion when such an explicit linguistic marker as an anaphor is not present in 
language. Clark (1977) described different types of bridging inferences in which the 
reference is justified as it is related to another entity or entities in the previous 
discourse context. Consider for example the sentences in (2). In the latter sentence, 
when people encounter the word engine, they might make a bridging inference that 
the person is talking about the same car as in the first sentence. This bridging 
inference is drawn by making use of the background knowledge that cars tend to have 
an engine (see also McKoon, Gerrig, & Green, 1996). 
 
(2) John bought a new car. The engine needed tuning.  
 
Similarly to backward inferences, there are different types of inferences that are 
drawn in forward fashion in language comprehension. Traditionally, elaborative 
inferences are used to define certain strict predictions people make based on 
constraining contexts (e.g., Keefe & McDaniel, 1993; McDaniel, Schmalhofer, & 
Keefe, 2001). For example, reading the first sentence in (3) may constrain people to 
make elaborative inference that the report was burned, and therefore, the latter 
sentence has been found to be easy to comprehend and integrate to the previous 
context.  
 
(3) The spy threw the report in the fire. The ashes floated up the chimney. 
 
In addition to the strict elaborative inferences, it is also suggested that people 
selaboratively activate other types of information such as gender stereotypes (e.g., 
Oakhill, Garnham, & Reynolds, 2002; Sanford, 1985). For example, in (1) people 
may make such an inference when they hear the word chimney sweep by inferring 
Introduction 
 12
that chimney sweeps stereotypically refer to males. In this case, the inference is not 
made to refer to any particular consequence of the action or event such as described in 
the example (3); instead, the activation is more generic in nature.  
Based on the direction of inferences drawn in discourse, bridging inferences are 
also often called backward inferences and elaborative inferences forward inferences. 
In this thesis, I use the term ‘bridging inference’ or ‘backward inference’ to denote all 
kinds of inferences people draw in backward fashion and the term ‘elaborative 
inference’ or ‘elaborative activation’ to denote both types of elaborative inferences: 
strict predictions or general activation. The exact nature of the inference is specified 
when necessary. 
 
1.2 Inferences and semantics in comprehension theories 
In psycholinguistics, several different discourse comprehension theories have been 
proposed. One important difference between the theories is what kinds of inferences 
they assume are drawn during online comprehension. However, many theories are 
somewhat ambiguous on the question of what kind of information results in 
inferences. More specifically, what is the role of semantic cues and how strong are 
these cues compared to discourse/structural cues? In what follows, I will review 
theories that make assumptions about either forward activation or backward use of 
semantic information (or both), and the relative importance of semantics compared to 
discourse/structural cues during inferencing. 
 
1.2.1 Mental model approaches 
Different versions of the Mental Model theories make important claims about both 
inference generation and the role of semantics in inference generation. Mental Model 
approaches assume that language comprehension consists of constructing mental or 
imaginary models; thus, they aim to unite language processing with thinking and 
reasoning in general (Garnham, 1993, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1994). These 
theories are built on the view that there is a direct link between perception and 
language: People use language to talk about their perception of the world (obtained 
through their primary sense, vision), and it is assumed that the mental representation 
of the perceived and the described worlds are the same (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 
1976). In current forms of the theories, the representations are seen as mental models 
of real or imaginary situations of these worlds (Garnham, 2001). In other words, 
when people are talking or thinking about the world, they represent situations in the 
real world, and when people are talking or thinking about the fictional worlds or 
beliefs, they represent situations of imaginary worlds.  
Mental Model theories assume that language comprehension occurs incrementally 
so that every new piece of information is continuously integrated into previous 
information during comprehension. In this respect, the modern Mental Model theories 
(described below) are closely related to earlier discourse comprehension theories such 
as Kintsch’s (1988, 1998; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978) Construction-Integration 
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theory. This theory explains how people derive meaning from the discourse, i.e., what 
kinds of representations become encoded from the text and how that encoding 
happens during the course of comprehension. Unlike the other Mental Models 
however, this model assumes two processing stages in which mental representations 
are constructed from the literal propositions in the text. More precisely, the first stage, 
construction, includes inferences from local text-based information such as word, 
meanings, their associations and propositions derived from word meanings. This level 
allows several kinds of inferences, both elaborative and bridging inferences, to be 
created in parallel. Those elaborative inferences that turn out to be irrelevant are then 
deactivated in the second, integration stage that occurs after the connections 
described above are constructed. In the integration stage, those propositions and 
inferences that support the global discourse representation strengthen each other and 
other propositions and inferences are inhibited. When exactly integration occurs, can 
vary: According to the early version of the theory (Kintsch, 1988), this stage was 
assumed to take place at sentence boundaries and thus did not assume incremental 
word-by-word integration, as is the case with Mental Model theories (Garnham, 2001; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).  
One part of Kintch’s theorising is the situation model that comprehenders build 
from the linguistic input. This situation model is similar to the type of mental model 
that is assumed to be constructed by the current Mental Models approaches 
(Garnham, 1993, 2001; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). When reading or listening to 
language, comprehenders build a mental representation of the discourse by imagining 
how the events described in the discourse have occurred or would occur in the real or 
imaginary world. It should also be noted that this type of approach is similar to the 
kind of situation models that are assumed by embodied language comprehension 
models (Zwaan, 2004; Zwaan & Madden, 2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998; Barsalou, 1999). These models assume that people not only create 
a situational representation of the events during language comprehension but also 
simulate the events mentally. It is also suggested that such mental simulations are a 
compulsory part of language comprehension, and without such simulations 
comprehension processes are partly inhibited (see e.g., Fischer & Zwaan, 2008, for a 
recent discussion about the nature of simulations during comprehension).  
Inferences and semantics. From the inferential processing perspective, Mental 
Model theories provide testable hypotheses to the questions of (1) what kinds of 
inferences are drawn online and (2) what the role of semantics is during these 
processes. They suggest that both backward and forward inferences are drawn online. 
While online drawing of backward inferences seems fairly uncontroversial, as will be 
shown in the next section, forward inferences are not assumed to be drawn online by 
theories opposing the Mental Model theories, such as the Minimalist Account 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1992).  
Mental Model theories allow several types of forward inferences to be drawn 
online. For example, when people encounter the word car in a discourse, they may 
infer that cars have an engine. In addition, the background knowledge that is used in 
such inferencing can be either knowledge of specific things (such as this particular car 
has an engine) or a general knowledge (all cars have engines) (Clark, 1997; Garnham, 
2001). In a similar vein, it is hypothesised that when people encounter a word such as 
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secretary or chimney sweep, they might infer that the former typically refers to female 
characters while the latter refers to male characters (Garnham, Oakhill, & Reynolds, 
2002; Oakhill et al., 2005; Reynolds, Garnham, & Oakhill, 2006; Sanford, 1985). 
Analogically, it could be hypothesised that other types of semantic information can 
also be inferred elaboratively. For example, when people encounter interpersonal 
verbs such as frighten and fear that are found to bias resolution of the pronoun he in a 
sentence such as John frightened/feared Bill, because he… toward NP1 (frighten) or 
NP2 (fear), it may well be that such biasing information is elaboratively activated 
when hearing the verb, and the activation is not postponed until the pronoun is 
encountered and needs to be resolved (see Chapter 1.3.2 for a detailed description of 
these verbs and their biases).  
According to Mental Model theories, forward activations occur because these 
models assume that interpretation is not only driven by explicitly stated information 
in the discourse and the propositions created between text parts, but instead, people 
also activate information related to each word in context by using general world 
knowledge and previous personal experience. After this information is activated, it is 
assumed to become quickly integrated into the current situation model, and the model 
is continuously updated during the course of processing based on this new 
information (Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). This 
is in line with the incremental view of language comprehension, according to which 
every new piece of information is integrated into the previous context as soon as this 
information becomes available (e.g., McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, 1994; 
MacDonald; Trueswell, Tanenhaus, & Garnsey, 1994). Importantly, the incremental 
approach held by Mental Model theories allows several types of information - 
including different dimensions of semantic information - to be used in inferences in 
order to continuously update the situation model. Unlike in some other processing 
models, as will be seen below, Mental Model theories assume that semantic 
information affects the generation of inferences.  
 
1.2.2 Other theoretical approaches 
Unlike the Mental Model theories, other theories have set more constraints on 
what kinds of inferences are drawn online and how different types of structural and 
semantic cues contribute to inference generation. Such theories include, for example, 
the Minimalist Account proposed by McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, 1988, 1989, 1992) 
and a set of more structurally motivated theories like Structure Building Theory 
(Gernsbacher, 1989, 1990; Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988), Centering Theory and 
Discourse Prominence Theory (e.g., Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Gordon, Grosz, & 
Gilliom, 1993; Grosz, Joshi, & Weinstein, 1995) as well as the Two-Stage Model of 
pronoun resolution (Corbett & Chang, 1983; Garrod & Sanford, 1994; Garrod & 
Terras, 2000). 
Minimalist account. McKoon and Ratcliff (1986, 1988, 1992) have proposed the 
Minimalist Account of inference generation during reading. The model assumes, in 
contrast to Mental Models, that people do not fully represent the situation that can be 
inferred on the basis of the text. Instead, according to the Minimalist approach, only 
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those inferences that are necessary for local textual coherence are routinely made 
during online processing. Based on this assumption, it can be argued that forward 
inferences are not drawn online: at the point when they are drawn during 
comprehension, forward inferences do not contribute to the local coherence of the 
text: For example, inferring gender stereotype information of the word secretary in a 
sentence John called his secretary does not help to understand the meaning of the 
sentence. This assumption thus implies, for example, that gender stereotype 
information is not activated when people encounter a gender-stereotype word in the 
discourse. This assumption is clearly in contradiction to the assumptions of the 
Mental Model theories, as discussed above.  
An important question is under what circumstances inferences are made online. 
According to the Minimalist Account, when people hear an anaphoric expression, 
they need to resolve it in order to build a coherent interpretation. Therefore, if the 
pronoun is ambiguous and activation of semantic information such as gender 
stereotypes of its potential antecedents may be helpful for resolving the pronoun, it is 
assumed that comprehenders activate and use this information during online language 
comprehension.  
In addition, the Minimalist Account assumes that information that is readily 
available from short-term memory becomes activated during online comprehension. 
The term of ‘readily available’ is not clearly defined and thus somewhat open to 
interpretation as noted for example by Garnham (2001). However, McKoon and 
Ratcliff (1992) followed Kintsch and Van Dijk (1978) in assuming that information 
that is readily available in short-term memory contains the explicitly stated words in 
the current or immediately preceding context and the propositions derived from them. 
Based on this definition, it can be argued that this model assumes that information 
that is not part of the words’ denotative meaning is not activated during online 
comprehension. One example of such information is gender stereotypes: they are not 
part of the word’s denotative meaning and cannot be determined directly from the 
propositions derived from the discourse. Thus, the Minimalist Account does not 
predict elaborative activation of semantic information such as gender stereotypes. 
Structurally motivated approaches. The following approaches are mainly focused 
on the pronoun resolution instead of dealing with inferences in general. In her 
Structure Building Theory, Gernsbacher (1988, 1989, 1990; Gernsbacher & 
Hargreaves, 1989) proposed that a coherent mental representation of the “structure” 
of a sentence or a discourse is built by first laying a foundation (a mental frame) on 
which all the subsequent information is mapped. In Structure Building Theory, the 
first-mentioned entity in a sentence or discourse is selected as the starting point for 
the first layer as it becomes available first and is thus accessible during the initial 
processing stage. Subsequent information is then mapped onto this representation. 
Thus, the first-mentioned entity carries a special role in structure building.  
Although the privileged role of first-mentioned character is often seen as a general 
cognitive principle rather than a purely structural (linguistic) feature, I have 
categorised this approach as a “structurally motivated approach”. The reason is that in 
this model the most relevant property is the surface structure: the first-mentioned 
entity has a privileged role regardless of other structural, semantic or thematic 
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properties (Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1989). The first-mentioned advantage is often 
found in pronoun resolution studies, as can been seen in Chapter 1.3: An ambiguous 
pronoun is often resolved to refer back to the NP1 rather than the NP2 (see also 
Gernsbacher, 1988; Corbett & Chang, 1983; Von Eckhardt & Potter, 1985).  
A different structural approach is provided by Centering Theory, which aims to 
explain pronoun resolution based on how attention is centered around certain entities 
in a sentence. This approach builds upon a prominence hierarchy that is defined on 
the basis of surface features of a sentence (see (4), Gordon et al., 1993; Gordon & 
Hendrick, 1997a,b; Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Grosz et al., 1995).  
 
(4) subject > object > oblique/other 
 
Thus, unlike Structure Building Theory, Centering Theory assigns importance to 
grammatical roles rather than to the surface position of entities in a sentence.  
Grammatical role has been found to be an important factor when resolving pronouns. 
More precisely, people tend to resolve an ambiguous pronoun as referring back to the 
grammatical subject rather than to the grammatical object of the previous context (see 
Chapter 1.3). Later, Gordon and Hendrick (1998) modified the theory by proposing 
an extended model called Discourse Prominence Theory. This theory was created to 
integrate different referring expressions into the earlier proposed model. However, 
this model also took into account the earlier findings suggesting that grammatical role 
is not the only important surface feature that contributes to the pronoun resolution by 
including both order-of-mention and grammatical role into the prominence ranking. 
Based on a modified hierarchy, Discourse Prominence Theory assumes that entities 
mentioned earlier in a sentence are more preferred than those mentioned later in the 
sentence and that the grammatical subject is more preferred than the grammatical 
object.  
Importantly, neither of the above structural approaches takes into account the 
semantics or the thematic role of potential antecedents presented in the preceding 
linguistic context. Thus, the effects of verb semantics in studies of pronoun resolution 
with sentences such as John frightened/feared Bill, because he… are difficult to 
explain with these approaches: These studies have shown that the pronoun is resolved 
based on the NP1- and NP2-biasing information of the verbs (see e.g., Gimenes, 
Caplan, & Rigalleau, 2006, for a recent review of these studies): Following the verb 
frightened (NP1-biased verb) the pronoun is resolved to refer to John while following 
the verb feared (NP2-biased verb) the pronoun is resolved to refer to Bill (see Chapter 
1.3.2 for a more detailed description of these studies). These findings clearly show 
that semantic information presented prior to the pronoun plays an important role in 
searching for the antecedent for the pronoun. However, as noted above, none of the 
above structural approaches succeeds in explaining these findings. 
Interestingly, another structural approach, the Two-Stage Model of pronoun 
resolution, may potentially explain (some of) these results. This model assumes that 
semantic information is activated and used late during the course of processing 
(Corbett & Chang, 1983; Garrod & Sanford, 1994; Garrod & Terras, 2000). The 
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model sets strict constraints on the type of information that is used during the first 
stage of processing, but not on the information used during the second stage. In the 
first stage, the candidate antecedents are activated based on constraints such as 
number, grammatical gender and other structural features. Only in the second stage, 
contextual information and general world knowledge is used to restrict the number of 
potential antecedents. Of these, the former stage is often called bonding and the latter 
resolution (see e.g., Garrod & Terras, 2000). This approach suggests that finding a 
correct referent for an unambiguous anaphoric expression occurs in the first stage by 
using the structural constraints described above as cues and is validated in the second 
stage, while processing of ambiguous anaphoric expressions always requires the 
resolution stage, during which the most plausible referent is selected. It is this stage 
that could explain semantic effects found in the resolution of an ambiguous pronoun 
following NP1- and NP2-biasing verbs: In the first stage the first-mentioned subject is 
preferred as an antecedent and only in the second stage the semantically most 
plausible antecedent is selected. 
The structural theories described above set clear constraints on antecedent 
selection in backward inferences and the use of discourse/structural and semantic 
factors in these inferences. The main conclusion is that either semantic factors do not 
contribute to pronoun resolution at all or only during later stages of processing. These 
approaches face a challenge in explaining empirical findings of early semantic effects 
in pronoun resolution (these findings are detailed in the following section). Moreover, 
these approaches are intended to explain backward inferences rather than forward 
inferences. Thus, in what follows, I will refer back to these models only when 
discussing semantic effects in backward anaphoric processing. 
Despite the differences between the theories presented above, both Mental Models 
Theory and the several alternative approaches are supported by experimental 
evidence. For example, one line of studies suggests that forward inferences of specific 
causes, continuations or consequences are drawn during online processing supporting 
Mental Models (Calvo & Castillo, 1996, 1998; Calvo, Meseguer, & Carreiras, 2001; 
Fincher-Kiefer, 1993, 1995, 1996; Keefe, & McDaniel, 1993; Klin, Murray, Levine, 
& Guzmán, 1999; Millis, Morgan, & Graesser, 1990; Murray, Klin, & Myers, 1993; 
Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987; Whitney, Richie, & Crane, 1992). However, although 
these studies suggest that forward inferences are drawn online, some studies suggest 
that although they are activated, they might also become quickly deactivated or are 
maintained in memory only for a limited time (Fincher-Kiefer, 1995, 1996; Keefe, & 
McDaniel, 1993), and their activation may be dependent on a highly constrained 
context (Klin, Murray, Levine, & Guzmán, 1999). Contrary to the assumptions of 
Mental Models Theory, another line of research suggests that forward inferences are 
not made online (Bloom, Fletcher, van den Broek, Reitz, & Shapiro, 1990; Duffy, 
1986; Graesser, Haberlandt, & Koizumi, 1987; Magliano, Bagget, Johnson, & 
Graesser, 1993; Potts et al., 1988; Singer, & Ferreira, 1983) or the inferences are just 
minimally encoded (e.g., McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1986, 1989) or their activation is 
strategic in nature and thus may not necessarily be drawn online (Allbritton, 2004).  
As becomes evident from above, there is no general agreement on what types of 
inferences are drawn online. The Mental Model approaches are most flexible in this 
manner, assuming that both forward and backward inferences are drawn, while the 
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Minimalist Account sets the most constraints on the types of inferences that are drawn 
online and is the most explicit about under what kinds of conditions they are made. 
Furthermore, the above theories make different predictions about the cues used for 
anaphor resolution (a form of backward inferencing), but what is common to all of 
them, they assume structural factors to have an early effect in anaphor resolution. 
Importantly, in most theories the role of semantic cues in both forward and backward 
inferencing has remained underspecified. Therefore, by examining the use of different 
aspects of semantics during inferencing and by comparing their use with 
discourse/structural factors, it is possible to take a step toward a more comprehensive 
picture of inference generation and the importance of semantics during language 
comprehension. In what follows, I review the experimental literature on semantic 
effects on forward and backward inferencing and show how important questions have 
remained unresolved. 
 
1.3 Semantic factors in online inferences and anaphors 
When people build coreference relationships between text parts, it has been noted 
that people use different aspects of semantic information during inferencing (e.g., 
Garnham, Oakhill, & Cruttenden, 1992; Garnham, Traxler, Oakhill & Gernsbacher, 
1996; Koornneef, & Van Berkum, 2006; Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 2000), but 
the question of when during the course of processing the semantics is used has 
remained unresolved. One central question has been whether people use semantics 
only when processing backward inferences or whether semantic information is also 
activated elaboratively in forward fashion. In the thesis I tested the following 
dimensions of semantic information during backward inferencing and elaborative 
activation: gender stereotypes of role names and nouns, implicit causality bias of 
verbs and proto-role properties of agent and patient introduced by transitive verbs. As 
will be highlighted below, these dimensions provide interesting test cases in order to 
resolve the unanswered questions in the literature. Even though several hypotheses of 
the backward and forward use of semantic information in inferencing are proposed, 
the earlier studies have failed to answer these hypotheses. One reason has been the 
limitations of the selected methods used in those studies. 
 
1.3.1 Gender stereotypes 
The term gender stereotype refers to commonly shared information or belief that 
certain features are more common among males than females or among females than 
males. In language input, these beliefs can be inferred from the certain words; 
importantly however, gender stereotypes are not encoded in the denotative meanings 
of those words. For example, hearing the sentence John called his secretary does not 
state that the secretary is a woman, and assuming this is not needed in order to 
understand the sentence meaning. It is not yet known whether people activate 
elaboratively that secretaries are stereotypically female while hearing a sentence like 
the one above. However, when people subsequently read a sentence starting with a 
pronoun she, it is found that gender stereotype information is quickly activated and 
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used to resolve the antecedent of the pronoun (Duffy & Keir, 2004; Kennison & 
Trofe, 2003; Kreiner, Sturt, & Garrod, 2008; Osterhout, Bersick, & McLaughlin, 
1997; Sturt, 2003a,b). This evidence suggests that gender stereotype information is 
activated when integrating an anaphor to the previous context in backward fashion. 
Importantly also, these studies are in line with the assumption that gender stereotypes 
can be activated elaboratively. However, as can be seen below, the methods used 
have not allowed unequivocal confirmation of this hypothesis. 
Backward use of gender stereotypes. There is much evidence for backward use of 
gender stereotype information during inferencing. For example, using a word-by-
word self-paced reading task in English, Kennison and Trofe (2003) found that when 
a female gender stereotype noun (secretary) was presented as an antecedent for the 
following pronoun, reading times were prolonged late in the second sentence when 
the pronoun was inconsistent with the stereotypical gender of the role name such as in 
Example (5), in comparison to a condition in which the pronoun was consistent with 
the gender stereotype (6). The study showed that gender stereotype information is 
used in pronoun resolution, but it failed to disentangle whether this information was 
inferred when encountering the word secretary or only when the pronoun needed to 
be resolved and integrated into the previous context. 
 
(5) The secretary distributed an urgent memo. He made it clear that work 
would continue as normal. 
 
(6) The secretary distributed an urgent memo. She made it clear that work 
would continue as normal. 
 
Interestingly, the stereotype activation did not cause prolonged reading times at 
the mismatching pronoun itself, but instead later in the sentence. This finding 
suggests that gender stereotype information may require a certain time to become 
activated during online comprehension. Contrary to this finding, other studies have 
suggested that activation of gender stereotypes during backward inferences may be 
quick, and prolonged reading times for stereotypically inconsistent pronouns may be 
found at the pronoun itself (Duffy & Keir, 2004; Kreiner, Sturt, & Garrod, 2008; 
Sturt, 2003a,b). For example, in a study of English isolated sentences, Duffy and Keir 
(2004) found prolonged reading times for the reflective pronoun herself when it was 
inconsistent with the gender stereotype of the antecedent (e.g., the male-stereotype 
word electrician) compared to a stereotypically consistent role name. This result 
indicates that stereotype information is activated and used quickly in anaphor 
resolution.  
Duffy and Keir (2004) also showed that when participants were presented with a 
context in which the gender of the role name was explicitly indicated (see Example 
7), prolonged reading times in the stereotypically inconsistent condition were found 
already at the sentence-final noun (woman) in the second sentence compared to the 
stereotypically consistent condition (The electrician was a cautious man) (see also 
Irmen, 2007). In addition, when the gender was specified by the context, stereotype 
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information did not affect reading times of the pronoun in the last sentence. This 
showed that when gender information was provided explicitly in the context, the 
earlier activated gender stereotype information was not used in later pronoun 
resolution. 
 
(7) Jeff’s power had been unreliable ever since the tornado. The electrician 
was a cautious woman who carefully secured her ladder to the side of 
the house before checking the roof. Jeff suspected that high winds had 
loosened the connection to the power lines. The electrician taught 
herself a lot while fixing the problem. 
 
Activation of gender stereotypes during backward inferencing has also been found 
in electrophysiological studies by using for example event related potentials (ERP) 
that measure voltage differences of electric pulses on the scalp produced by a certain 
event such as the presentation of a target word in a sentence. For example, Osterhout 
et al. (1997) showed in a reading task in English that when a gender-marked reflexive 
pronoun was inconsistent with the gender stereotype information of its antecedent 
such as in (8), the brain produced a positive peak in the brain waves around 600 ms 
following the target onset (i.e., the so-called P600), when compared to a 
stereotypically consistent sentence (9). 
 
(8) The doctor prepared herself for the operation.  
(9) The doctor prepared himself for the operation. 
 
Interestingly, the gender mismatch resulted in a P600 effect, which is typically 
found for ungrammatical structures, and not a N400 effect, which is typically found 
for semantically anomalous materials or for other types of semantic violations (see 
Kutas & Federmeier, 2007, for a recent overview of ERP components related to 
language comprehension). Later research has suggested that the ERP component 
associated with gender mismatch is not a result of the brain treating the violation as 
ungrammatical; instead the nature of the agreement violation should be seen as a 
violation of syntactic preference (Hagoort & Brown, 1999; Van Berkum, Brown, & 
Hagoort, 1999a,b). Violation of syntactic preference occurs in situations in which the 
sentence is syntactically well-formed, but where syntactic properties fail to satisfy the 
currently built, preferred analysis of that sentence. Regardless of the exact nature of 
this effect, the finding suggests that the brain activates gender stereotypes quickly 
during backward inferencing.  
Taking both behavioural and neural evidence together, it can be hypothesised that 
gender stereotype information has an important role in backward inferencing. In 
addition, gender stereotype information may be inferred quickly when useful for 
backward inferencing (cf. Kennison & Trofe, 2003).  
Forward activation of gender stereotypes. A challenging issue related to the 
activation of gender stereotypes has been the question of whether gender stereotypes 
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are activated elaboratively in a forward fashion. In some of the above studies it has 
been suggested that the rapid effects of gender stereotypes during integration may be 
a result of activation of gender stereotypes already at the stereotype word (see the 
discussion in e.g., Duffy & Keir, 2004). However, the methods used do not allow us 
to conclusively differentiate whether gender stereotype information becomes 
activated in a backward fashion at the point when needed for integration, e.g., when a 
pronoun or another referent needs to be attached to the previously mentioned 
character, or also elaboratively following the gender stereotype noun.  
Sanford (1985) asked participants to read stories that included a male stereotype 
noun such as surgeon that later turned out to be a female person. He found that 
participants found it hard to understand the story. By using English stories such as 
(10), Reynolds et al. (2006) found that when readers encountered gender 
stereotypically inconsistent information, they slowed down their reading and 
sometimes even failed to interpret the identity of the surgeon (as indicated by an 
offline questionnaire administered after participants had read the story). 
 
(10) This morning a father and his son were driving along the motorway to 
work, when they were involved in a horrible accident. The father was 
killed and the son was quickly driven to the hospital severely injured. 
When the boy was taken into the hospital a passing surgeon exclaimed: 
“Oh my god, that is my son!” 
 
Reynolds et al (2006) argued that the increased reading times reflect elaborative 
inferencing. However, they measured reading times for the whole sentence, so it is 
unclear how rapidly such inferences are made. It is possible that the stereotype 
information is activated already when encountering the stereotype noun that would 
indicate elaborative activation. However, these studies have not been able to detect 
forward activation directly, as the stereotype effect was found only at the point where 
coherence in the discourse needs to be established: e.g., when the sentence containing 
the word son (10) has to be integrated to the preceding story. 
In a similar vein, Carreiras, Garnham, Oakhill and Cain (1996) observed a reading 
difficulty when gender stereotype information was inconsistent with the 
morphological gender of the noun’s determiner in Spanish. For example, sentences 
such as (11) that included words in which the gender-marked article mismatched with 
the stereotype nouns (la carpintera ‘carpenter’; a male-biased word with the feminine 
article + ending) took longer to read than sentences such as (12) in which the word 
did not cause such mismatch with its determiner (el carpintero; a male-biased noun 
with the masculine article + ending).  
 
(11) La carpintera tomó las medidas para hacer el armario. Era un encargo 
bastante urgente. Ella tenía que terminarlo en el plazo de una semana. 
‘The carpenter took measurements to make the cupboards. It was quite 
an urgent order. She had to finish it in the space of one week.’ 
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(12) El carpintero tomó las medidas para hacer el armario. Era un encargo 
bastante urgente. El tenía que terminarlo en el plazo de una semana. 
 ‘The carpenter took measurements to make the cupboards. It was quite 
an urgent order. He had to finish it in the space of one week.’ 
 
Based on these findings, Carreiras et al. (1996) suggested that stereotype 
information is activated when encountering the stereotype noun. However, because 
they used sentence reading times as their measure, it was not possible to determine 
when exactly in the sentence a reading difficulty occurred. As the stereotype noun 
was located in the sentence-initial position, the reading difficulty may have occurred 
during this sentence-initial noun or shortly after it, but it may also have occurred later 
in the sentence. Because of the coarse-grained reading time measure, the study was 
not able to determine whether activation occurs at or shortly following the stereotype 
noun.  
Interestingly, Kreiner et al. (2008) found only marginally significant late effects of 
gender stereotypes when using cataphoric expressions in which the gender-marked 
pronoun preceded the gender stereotype noun, such as After reminding herself about 
the letter, the minister... The stereotype effect was found only in the regression-path 
measures of the region that followed the gender-stereotype noun and not in any 
measures of the stereotype word region. When the stereotype noun was replaced by a 
definitional gender word such as the king, the mismatch effect was immediate. 
Kreiner et al (2008) argued that this finding shows that processing definitional and 
stereotypical gender is qualitatively different: while definitional gender is derived 
from the lexical entry itself, stereotypical gender is accessed via inferential 
processing. 
Besides studies investigating online sentence and discourse processing, studies on 
lexical processing have suggested that gender stereotypes are activated elaboratively. 
For example, Banaji and Hardin (1996) found that when people were asked to judge 
the gender of the English pronouns she and he, judgements were faster when they 
were primed by stereotypically consistent (doctor – he, nurse – she) than inconsistent 
words (doctor–she, nurse–he) (see also Cacciari & Padovani, 2007, for converging 
evidence in Italian). A similar pattern of results was found when people were asked to 
judge whether the word appearing on the screen was a pronoun or not: when the 
pronoun was preceded by a stereotypically consistent prime word, judgements were 
faster than when it was preceded by a stereotypically inconsistent prime word. In 
addition, Oakhill et al (2005) found a similar pattern of results in a study in which 
people were asked to make an explicit link between the prime and target by asking 
whether terms such as surgeon-brother or surgeon-sister could refer to the same 
person. Even in a study in which participants were encouraged to pay attention to 
unambiguous lexical gender relations such as landlady-sister and were told that some 
occupations were not clearly marked for gender but could be held either by men or 
women (i.e., in the cases of gender stereotype occupations), they were less likely to 
accept stereotypically inconsistent than consistent pairs and response times for the 
inconsistent pairs were also prolonged compared to consistent pairs. Oakhill et al. 
therefore proposed that activation of gender stereotypes might be difficult or even 
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impossible to suppress. Although these studies clearly show that gender stereotype 
information is activated and has an effect on response accuracies and times, activation 
was studied with isolated words, and therefore, the results cannot directly be 
generalised to elaborative activation of gender stereotypes in a discourse context. 
Relative importance of gender stereotypes. An additional aspect of backward use 
of gender stereotypes is their relative importance compared to other possible 
discourse/structural cues during inferencing. In the above examples (7-9), gender 
stereotype activation was studied by using structures that included only one possible 
antecedent for the pronoun - either stereotypically matched or mismatched. In 
addition, although it could be argued that prolonged reading times (or P600) would 
not have been found if gender stereotype information were not activated, these studies 
did not directly test how strong the gender stereotype cue is compared to other 
discourse/structural cues. This question can be addressed, for example, by using 
Finnish gender ambiguous anaphors (e.g., the third person pronoun hän ‘s/he’), which 
are used to refer to both male and female referents. In a context in which there are 
two possible antecedents, one structurally preferred and one stereotypically preferred, 
it is possible to shed light on the relative importance of gender stereotypes compared 
to discourse/structural cues during backward inferencing. It may well be that both 
discourse/structural and gender stereotype cues are used – as predicted on the basis of 
previous studies – but their relative importance may vary depending on the type of 
inference drawn; for example, in certain situations structural cues would be preferred 
over semantic cues, or vice versa (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Garrod, O’Brien, Morris, 
& Rayner, 1990; Greene, McKoon, & Ratcliff, 1992; Fincher-Kiefer, 1995). 
In sum, although previous evidence has clearly shown that gender stereotypes are 
used during backward inferencing, it remains unclear how strong these cues are 
compared to discourse/structural cues (also which one is preferred earlier during 
online discourse processing) Moreover, previous studies have failed to provide 
conclusive evidence for elaborative activation of gender stereotypes during natural 
discourse processing. These issues were investigated in Studies I and IV. 
 
1.3.2 Implicit causality 
The term implicit causality refers to events described with interpersonal verbs like 
frighten and fear. These verbs carry interesting biasing information: when people are 
asked to continue sentences consisting of NP1 VERBED NP2, BECAUSE… people 
tend to continue the story by referring to NP1 after the verbs like frighten and by 
referring to NP2 after the verbs like fear, see examples (13) and (14), respectively 
(Garvey & Caramazza, 1974, Garvey, Caramazza, & Yates, 1976; Guerry et al., 
2006). The continuations people typically produce reflect information about a cause 
associated with either NP1 (following the verb frighten) or NP2 (following the verb 
fear). As this cause is encoded implicitly in the event described by the verb in the first 
clause, the phenomenon is called implicit causality. The two groups of verbs can be 





(13) John frightened Mary, because he… [NP1-biased verb] 
(14) John feared Mary, because she… [NP2-biased verb] 
 
Pickering and Majid (2007) suggest that implicit causality should be used to refer 
to reasons for events. For example, the continuation was scared following the above 
examples (13 and 14) would refer to the reason for the emotional reaction denoted by 
the verb. Following Garvey and Caramazza (1974) they mention that implicit 
causality “provides an abstraction of the type of reason that is most likely to be 
provided for the event, and indicates which entity the reason tends to be about” 
(Pickering & Majid, 2007: 785). Moreover, the bias is an inference drawn from the 
description of an event and can be determined probabilistically. This indicates that the 
implicit causality verbs do not produce equally strong biases (Garvey & Caramazza, 
1974; see also Rudolph & Fösterling, 1997, for a meta-analysis of the biasing 
probabilities). The biasing strength can be best determined by using “neutral” NPs 
(e.g., John and Mary) combined with implicit causality verbs (John frightened/feared 
Mary) rather than using NPs that carry biasing information inferred from general 
knowledge. For example, it is generally assumed that a boy might be more afraid of 
his father than another way around. Thus, this general world knowledge could 
interfere with the biasing strength caused by the verbs themselves (The father 
frightened/feared the boy). 
Crinean and Garnham (2006) defined implicit causality slightly differently from 
what is described above. They argued that this information is based on the semantic 
or thematic representation of the verb arguments (for similar accounts, see Au, 1986; 
Brown & Fish, 1983; Stevenson, Crawley, & Kleinman, 1994). Therefore, in their 
definition, implicit causality is not considered probabilistic, unlike in the above 
definition (Pickering & Majid, 2007). As pointed out by Pickering and Majid (2007), 
this leads to a situation in which implicit causality is an all-or-none property of the 
verbs. However, such an interpretation is not supported by earlier studies that clearly 
showed that implicit causality is probabilistic in nature and that the strength of the 
bias varies across verbs (Garvey & Caramazza, 1974; Rudolph & Fösterling, 1997).  
In studies of implicit causality, important questions have been when during the 
course of processing implicit causality information becomes activated and how it 
affects inference generation. The Clausal Integration Account assumes that the use of 
implicit causality information in pronoun resolution occurs during integration and is 
therefore a late process (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000), 
whereas the Immediate Focusing Account assumes that comprehenders rapidly make 
use of implicit causality information (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van 
Berkum, 2006; MacDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon, Greene, & Ratcliff, 
1993; Van Berkum, Koornneef, Otten, & Nieuwland, 2007). Previous studies have 
failed to unequivocally decide between these hypotheses; again, the methods used 
have turned out to be unsatisfying to differentiate between the accounts. 
Late use of implicit causality. Experimental studies that have provided support for 
either of the above accounts, clausal integration or immediate focusing, have 
approached the question of when implicit causality is used by investigating pronoun 
resolution. These studies have demonstrated a strong effect of verb-based implicit 
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causality information: people tend to interpret the pronoun referring to the character 
that is the cause of the event, i.e., NP1 is the preferred antecedent for the pronoun 
after NP1-biased verbs such as frighten and NP2 after NP2-biased verbs such as fear 
(Garnham et al., 1996; Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; 
McDonald and MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Long & DeLey, 2000; 
Stewart et al., 2000; Van Berkum et al., 2007). However, as was already noted above, 
the studies fail to agree about timing of the use of implicit causality during pronoun 
resolution.  
The Clausal Integration Account states that implicit causality information has an 
effect on comprehension only during a late semantic clausal integration phase, when 
implicit causality information in the main clause is integrated with the explicitly 
stated causal information in the subordinate clause (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 
1996; Stewart et al., 2000). For example, using a probe recognition task in English, 
Garnham and colleagues (1996) showed that the responses to the probe words that 
were presented at the end of the sentence were prolonged when the ending of the 
sentence was inconsistent with the implicit causality bias such as in (15). This effect 
was found irrespective of whether the probe word referred to the antecedent of the 
pronoun or not (i.e., for both probe words, Walter and Ronald, in Example 15). 
Interestingly, the study did not show the same effect for the probe words presented 
immediately following the pronoun. These findings were interpreted as evidence to 
support the claim that implicit causality takes considerable time before it exerts an 
effect.  
 
(15) Walter apologized to Ronald this morning because he demanded an apology. 
[N1 biased verb / Incongruent ending] 
 
Similarly, Stewart et al. (2000) found no early effects of implicit causality in self-
paced reading experiments, but instead, found a late facilitation for sentences with 
consistent implicit and explicit causes. In their experiment, participants read 
sentences similar to those in Garnham et al. (1996). In Experiment 2, the participants 
were presented the sentences in two fragments with the split between the fragments 
following the pronoun (or a full NP) in the second clause (NP1 verbed NP2 because 
he). The finding that implicit causality inconsistency prolonged reading times only in 
the second fragment was taken as evidence for late use of implicit causality 
information. However, because a coarse-grained reading time measure was used, it is 
possible that some of the differences found in the later fragment are spill-over effects 
related to the pronoun presented at the end of the first fragment. Therefore, although 
these studies found evidence for late use of implicit causality and supported Clausal 
Integration Account, it may well be that the experimental techniques were not ideally 
suited to find early implicit causality effects (see also the discussion about challenges 
of interpreting results from probe recognition tasks in Chapter 2.1). 
Early activation/use of implicit causality. In contrast to the integration account 
presented above, the Immediate Focusing Account claims that implicit causality 
information is used much earlier to focus on one of the referents at the expense of 
another, and thus it has an effect on reference resolution immediately when a pronoun 
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is encountered (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; 
MacDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 2007). 
For example, McDonald and MacWhinney (1995; see also McKoon et al., 1993; 
Long & DeLey, 2000) observed an early effect of implicit causality on probes 
presented immediately after the pronoun, thus providing evidence that contradicts the 
results of Garnham et al. (1996) and Stewart et al. (2000). However, the sentence 
materials used by McDonald and MacWhinney (1995) differed from those in 
Garnham et al. (1996) and Stewart et al. (2000), in that only congruent endings were 
presented. Therefore, their stories might have led participants to make strategic 
predictions of the upcoming discourse. These strategic predictions might have 
contributed to the observed prolonged responses to the incongruent probe words (to 
the name of NP1 following the NP2-biased verbs and to the name of NP2 following 
the NP1-biased verbs). 
In accordance with the focusing account, Koornneef and Van Berkum (2006) also 
found an effect of implicit causality shortly after people read the gender-marked 
pronoun in experiments on Dutch. In stories such as (16), in which the gender-marked 
pronoun hij ‘he’ was inconsistent with the implicit causality bias of the verb (in the 
example the verb bood zijn excuses aan ‘apologized’ is a subject-biasing verb), 
prolonged reading times were observed compared to stories where the gender of the 
pronoun was consistent with the implicit causality bias. Koornneef and Van Berkum 
(2006) used two reading time methods: self-paced reading and eye-tracking. While 
the results of the self-paced reading experiment showed an implicit causality effect 
only after the pronoun, the “early” effect of implicit causality was found only in the 
regression path measure in eye-tracking. However, it could be argued that this 
measure does not reflect the earliest possible stage of comprehension, as it also 
includes fixations after making a regression from the region of interest (but before the 
eyes fixate words following the region of interest). The early eye-tracking measures 
(such as first fixation duration) did not show an effect until the third word after the 
pronoun, suggesting that this effect may not be operating quickly at the pronoun. 
 
(16) David en Linda reden allebei behoorlijk hard. Bij een druk kruispunt 
botsten zij met hun auto’s stevig op elkaar. Linda bood haar excuses 
aan David omdat hij volgens de getuigen van het ongeluk alle schuld 
had. 
 
‘David and Linda were both driving pretty fast. At a busy intersection 
they crashed hard into each other. Linda apologized to David because 
he according to the witnesses was the one to blame.’ 
 
Van Berkum and colleagues (2007) conducted an ERP study using the same 
stimulus materials. They found a P600 effect appearing 400-700ms after the onset of 
a gender-marked pronoun that mismatched with the verb bias. Interestingly, the 
mismatch caused a P600 and not a N400 – similar to the earlier cited studies 
investigating gender stereotype mismatches, which also showed a P600 effect instead 
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of a N400 effect (see Hagoort & Brown, 1999; Osterhout et al, 1997; Van Berkum et 
al., 1999a,b). 
As the literature of both behavioural and neural studies suggests, implicit causality 
is inferred and used when integrating an anaphor into the preceding linguistic context. 
However, my previous discussion makes clear that there is no consensus on when 
exactly implicit causality is inferred. Importantly, studies supporting the Immediate 
Focusing Account suggest that implicit causality can be inferred quickly and is used 
to highlight one of the characters over another; i.e., the NP1-biased verbs like frighten 
highlight NP1 and NP2-biased verbs like fear highlight NP2 in a discourse. However, 
these studies have observed the implicit causality effect only following the pronoun 
and thus have not been able to determine whether it is the anaphoric marker that 
prompts activation of implicit causality information or whether implicit causality 
information is activated even without such a prompt. By adopting a strict 
interpretation of the Immediate Focusing Account, implicit causality may be activated 
even prior to the pronoun. However, such activation could not be found in these 
studies due to the methodological challenges: Even though implicit causality would 
have become activated prior to the pronoun, it is not clear how this could have been 
measured from the reading times and ERP components. 
Relative importance of implicit causality. Just as studies of gender stereotypes, 
the above studies of implicit causality have shown that semantic information has an 
important role when resolving an antecedent of an anaphor. The question of whether 
implicit causality has a priority role during such backward integration has remained 
unresolved. The early priority role of implicit causality in pronoun resolution is 
predicted by the Immediate Focusing Account because it assumes that one of the 
referents is already highly prominent in the mental model and thus has direct access 
to be interpreted as an antecedent when encountering a pronoun in discourse 
(Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; Van Berkum et al., 2007). However, as shown in 
Example (16), the material in these studies included a gender-marked pronoun that 
referred unambiguously to either a male or a female character. This character was 
either consistent or inconsistent with the implicit causality bias. It could be argued 
that in such cases, implicit causality is not strongly tested against other possible cues. 
Taking the same analogy as with the gender stereotypes, it could be argued that a 
better study would be one in which implicit causality is pitted against 
discourse/structural cues and by having an ambiguous pronoun that can equally refer 
to both characters, such as in (15). In addition, the context following the pronoun 
should also be kept ambiguous in order to give the processor ample time to come up 
with a decision without forcing it to do so rather quickly. 
In sum, studies of implicit causality have proposed a large set of hypotheses that 
have remained unresolved. The questions about whether implicit causality is activated 
prior to the pronoun or only later during integration phase; whether implicit causality 
has a priority role during anaphor resolution or is sensitive to other potential 
discourse/structural cues; and what is the timing of the effects during pronoun 
resolution, are important issues subject to further testing with a more appropriate 




1.3.3 Proto-role properties 
A somewhat different aspect of verb semantics is described by proto-roles that are 
typically defined in relation to the thematic roles1, or alternatively thematic relations 
of the main verb arguments such as agent and patient (Dowty, 1991; Schlesinger, 
1995). Dowty (1991) proposed that these thematic roles could be classified based on 
the proto-roles the arguments exhibit. According to this view, agent and patient 
properties of subjects and objects are computed based on a number of independently 
occurring subcomponents of basic semantic properties such as sentience, volition and 
movement (see Table 1 for a more complete list). The number of these 
subcomponents for each argument is not fixed, and therefore, it is likely that some 
thematic roles exhibit more of these properties than others. The list of proto-agent and 
proto-patient properties as defined by Dowty (1991; see also Hopper & Thompson, 
1980; Kako, 2006) are shown in Table 1. 
Prototypically agent-like properties involve elements such as agent volitionally 
causing an event, moving in the event or being aware of the participation in a certain 
state or event (sentience). In addition, a prototypical agent also exists in the world 
irrespective of the described event. In contrast, prototypical patients exhibit properties 
such as being an incremental theme, being causally affected by the event or 
undergoing another kind of change of state, and do not actively participate in the 
agent’s movement. A prototypical patient is also often described in relation to the 








                                                           
1Thematic roles are often assumed to serve an argument-indexing function. The theta-
criterion in Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981) stipulates that each NP of a 
predicate carries only one thematic role in a given context, i.e., each thematic role defines 
what type of role each argument plays in an event described in the linguistic context. Typical 
thematic roles are agent, patient and theme among others (e.g., Fillmore, 1968, 1977; 
Jackendoff, 1972, 1976, 1983, 1990). Because of their conceptual or semantic nature, it is 
argued that thematic roles should be situated at the semantic or conceptual level of language 
description, not at the syntactic level, even though they are not unequivocally separable from 
syntactic roles of the arguments (Jackendoff, 1972, 1983, 1990; Kako, 2006). 
2In order to further validate the proto-role hypothesis, Kako (2006) used a questionnaire to 
test proto-role properties of transitive verbs, more precisely, the number and nature of proto-
agent properties subjects exhibit and the number and nature of proto-patient properties objects 
exhibit. The results confirmed the overall hypothesis that subjects would be rated to have more 
prototypically agent-like than patient-like properties, and similarly, objects to have more 




Some of the proto-role properties of agents and patients proposed by Dowty (1991). 
 
Proto-Agent Properties Proto-Patient Properties 
Volitional involvement in the event or 
state 
Undergoes change of state 
 
Sentience (and/or perception) Incremental theme 
Causing an event or change of state in 
another participant 
Causally affected by another participant 
 
Movement (relative to another 
participant) 
Stationary relative to movement of 
another participant 
Exists independently of the event 
named by the verb 
Does not exist independently of the 
event, or not at all 
 
Dowty’s proto-role account has its roots in the Transitivity Hypothesis proposed 
by Hopper and Thompson (1980). According to this hypothesis, the above listed 
features (among some others) contribute to the salience or prominence of the entities 
in the sentence, i.e., how visible these entities are for the comprehender. The verbs 
can be categorised in the following way: the more proto-role properties the verb 
arguments carry, the higher in transitivity the verb is; and the fewer proto-role 
properties the verb arguments have, the lower in transitivity the verb is. Thus, the 
more prototypical properties the verb arguments exhibit, the more foregrounded they 
are in the discourse, while fewer prototypical properties they exhibit, the more 
backgrounded they are in the discourse. The proto-role properties are summarised in 
Table 2.  
The arguments of verbs hit and see exhibit a different amount of proto-agent and 
proto-patient properties. The arguments of highly transitive verbs like hit exhibit 
several proto-agent and proto-patient properties: Their subjects are volitionally 
involved in and aware of the action, voluntarily causing the event or causing a state 
change of object as well as performing a movement. Their objects are similarly 
prototypical: The object undergoes a change of state and is causally affected by the 
event and does not necessarily move during the action. However, when considering 
low transitive verbs, their subjects exhibit only a limited number of proto-agent 
properties. For example, in the case of see, the agent is volitionally involved in and 
aware of the action, but does not have any other proto-agent properties. Furthermore, 









Proto-role properties for high-transitive verb hit and low-transitive verb see. 
 
  Hit See 
Proto-Agent 
properties 
of the subject 
Volitional involvement   
Sentience/Perception   
Causing event/change of state   
Movement   
Proto-Patient 
properties 
of the object 
Undergo change of state   
Incremental theme   
Causally affected   
Stationary   
 
 
Proto-roles during online comprehension. Unlike the literature on gender 
stereotypes and implicit causality, there is a very limited literature on whether high 
and low transitivity affects online language comprehension. One study that illustrates 
the importance of argument role properties was conducted by Rose (2005), who 
studied argument role properties of verbs and showed that they affect adult online 
processing. Instead of manipulating proto-roles directly, he took advantage of the 
assumption that theme is higher in the thematic hierarchy than semantic goals, as 
illustrated in (17) (Larson, 1988; Speas, 1990). The higher position in the hierarchy 
also entails a more foregrounded and salient/prominent role for themes than goals.  
 
(17) agent > theme > goal 
 
In a series of self-paced reading experiments, Rose (2005) showed that after both 
(18) and (19), participants were faster to read the pronoun (and the definite noun 
phrase) when it referred to the semantic theme (20a) than to the semantic goal (20b). 
Interestingly, the effect was found irrespective of the syntactic position, i.e., whether 
the theme preceded the goal or vice versa. However, in an off-line judgement task, in 
which participants were asked to rate the continuations (20a/b), he found the former 
more acceptable after (18) than (19).  
 
(18) John sprayed some paint on a wall. 





(20a) It dribbled down and made a mess. 
(20b) It was big and needed two coats. 
 
Although this study manipulated the relative order of the antecedents (theme and 
goal) of the following pronoun instead of the proto-role properties of verbs (by using 
different types of verbs), it showed that semantic information might have a significant 
role in pronoun resolution. However, it should be noted that using the pronoun it to 
refer to the word paint, is more problematic than using it to refer to the word wall, 
because paint is not a countable noun whereas wall is, and thus it is more plausible to 
refer to wall with it.  
However, this study further suggests that verb transitivity, including the proto-role 
properties of verbs, may be exploited in order to learn more about the importance of 
semantics in online inference generation. In addition, it is also of interest to study the 
effects of proto-role properties among children in order to resolve the developmental 
aspect about the acquisition of these properties  (Ibbotson & Tomasello, 2009; Kako, 
2006). In Chapter 1.5, I will return to the issue of why proto-roles may be preferred 
over gender stereotypes or implicit causality in the studies of the importance of 
semantics during online child language comprehension. 
 
1.4 Discourse/structural factors in backward inferencing 
In order to answer the questions introduced above about the relative importance of 
semantics compared to other cues, competing discourse/structural factors were 
introduced in the current studies. Several different discourse and structural factors 
have been found to be important during online inferencing: For example, factors such 
as order-of-mention, grammatical role and topicality have shown to contribute to the 
salience/prominence of the entities in discourse, and thus to inference generation 
(e.g., Arnold, Eisenband, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2000; Bestgen & Vonk, 
2000; Crawley, Stevenson, & Kleinman, 1990; Frederiksen, 1981; Gernsbacher, 
1990; Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Järvikivi, Van Gompel, Hyönä, & Bertram, 
2005; Kaiser & Trueswell, 2008, in press; Vonk, Hustinx, & Simons, 1992). In what 
follows, I shortly highlight the main findings of studies investigating the effects of 
these factors on online inferencing. 
 
1.4.1 Order-of-mention 
In her Structure Building Theory, Gernsbacher (1990) argued that people construct 
a mental representation of sentences by mapping new information onto the first 
mentioned entity. Therefore, order-of-mention plays a fundamental role in organising 
and highlighting information during language comprehension. Because of its 
privileged status, the first-mentioned entity is also assumed to be the preferred 
antecedent for a subsequently presented pronoun (see also MacWhinney, 1977). This 
assumption has been confirmed experimentally, as reviewed next. 
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For example, using a probe recognition task in English, Gernsbacher and 
Hargreaves (1989) showed that when a probe word (e.g., Lisa or Tina) was presented 
after sentences such as (21) and (22), the responses to the probe words were faster 
when they referred to NP1 (Tina) than NP2 (Lisa) – irrespective of the grammatical 
role of the first-mentioned entity (see also Carreiras, Gernsbacher, & Villa, 1995; 
Gernsbacher, Hargreaves, & Beeman, 1989; MacWhinney, 1977; McDonald & 
MacWhinney, 1995). Thus, the study supports the first-mentioned character’s 
privileged status in discourse.  
  
 (21) Tina beat Lisa in the state tennis match. 
 (22) Tina was beaten by Lisa in the state tennis match.   
 
The first-mention advantage has later been confirmed in pronoun resolution 
(Arnold et al., 2000; Järvikivi et al., 2005; Kaiser & Trueswell, 2008, in press). For 
example, by using the visual world eye-tracking method in English, Arnold et al. 
(2000) found that after hearing the ambiguous pronoun in (23), the probability of 
fixations to the first-mentioned character was higher than to the second-mentioned 
character.  
 
(23) Donald is bringing some mail to Mickey, while a violent storm is 
beginning.  He’s carrying an umbrella. 
 
(24) Donald is bringing some mail to Minnie, while a violent storm is 
beginning.  He’s/She’s carrying an umbrella. 
 
This close temporal link between eye movements toward this referent following 
the pronoun revealed that people rely on order-of-mention as a cue when resolving 
ambiguous pronouns that could also potentially have referred to the second-
mentioned character. However, the pronoun’s grammatical gender was unambiguous, 
as in (24), the probability of looking at Donald increased quickly following the 
pronoun he (the preference was supported by both order-of-mention and gender-
marked pronoun), compared to the probability of looking at Minnie which increased 
following the pronoun she (conflicting cues of order-of-mention that referred to NP1 
and gender-marked pronoun that referred to Minnie). These findings indicate that in 
pronoun resolution unambiguous grammatical gender marking of the pronoun was a 
stronger cue than order-of-mention. 
However, Arnold, Brown-Schmidt, Trueswell and Fagnano (2005) failed to 
observe a first-mention preference with children aged 5. Using the same materials as 
with adults (Arnold et al., 2000), they showed that children only exhibited a weak 
first-mention preference, and instead, their comprehension of pronouns was strongly 
driven by unambiguous gender marking of the pronoun (for similar findings, see also 
Arnold, Brown-Schmidt, & Trueswell, 2007, Experiment 2). However, contrary to 
Arnold et al. (2005, 2007), Song and Fischer (2005, 2007) found in a preferential 
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looking task a clear first-mention preference with children as young as 2 to 3 years 
old. They presented children with three-sentence long stories in English. In those 
sentences the antecedent was mentioned two to three times prior to the pronoun and 
always in the same sentence position. Thus, it could be argued that this repetition may 
have ensured the effect of first-mention preference. 
In most above studies order-of-mention was confounded with grammatical role. 
For example, the first-mentioned character was also the sentence subject in the 
examples (23-24). Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the effect was 
purely driven by order-of-mention or whether grammatical role might also have 
contributed to the findings (see e.g., Järvikivi et al., 2005). 
 
1.4.2 Grammatical role 
As indicated in the previous section, it has been suggested that the grammatical 
role of antecedents, that is, whether it is a grammatical subject or a grammatical 
object, may also contribute to discourse salience/prominence (e.g., Crawley et al., 
1990; Frederiksen, 1981; Gordon et al., 1993; Grosz & Sidner, 1986). As mentioned 
above, Gernsbacher and Hargreaves (1989) used passive structures in order to 
disentangle the effect of order-of-mention from that of grammatical role (Example 
22). However, they failed to show any subject advantage, but instead showed a first-
mention preference irrespective of the grammatical role (cf. Gordon et al., 1993).  
Recently, Järvikivi et al. (2005) used another type of manipulation in order to 
distinguish between the first-mention and subjecthood preferences. Due to its 
relatively free word order, Finnish allows structures in which either the grammatical 
subject is mentioned first in the sentence (25, SVO word order) or the object is 
mentioned first in the sentence (26, OVS word order), thus making it possible to tease 
apart first-mention and subjecthood effects without passive structures: while NP1 is 
the grammatical subject in (25), NP1 is the grammatical object in (26).   
 
(25) Tony Blair kätteli George Bushia valkoisessa talossa. [SVO]  
Hän…  
‘Tony Blair (SUBJ) shook hands with George Bush (OBJ) in the White 
House. S/he…’ 
 
(26) George Bushia kätteli Tony Blair valkoisessa talossa. [OVS] 
Hän… 
‘George Bush (OBJ) shook hands with Tony Blair (SUBJ) in the White 
House. S/he…’ 
 
Shortly after people heard the gender ambiguous pronoun hän (‘s/he’), the 
probability of fixations to the subject was higher than the probability of fixations to 
the object. In addition, the results showed more looks to the first-mentioned than the 
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second-mentioned character. The lack of interaction between these factors suggests 
that both preferences are operating independently by adding activation to the referents 
in the discourse.  
Earlier psycholinguistic studies have also shown that grammatical subjects are 
recalled more accurately in memory tasks (e.g., Clark & Card, 1969) and that they are 
highly likely to be mentioned again in the subsequent sentences (Givón, 1983). 
Taking together the earlier and more recent studies (Gordon et al., 1993; Järvikivi et 
al., 2005), it seems that grammatical role contributes to discourse 
salience/prominence. Therefore, both factors, order-of-mention and grammatical role, 
are important to take into account when studying the role of the discourse/structural 
factors in backward inferencing. 
 
1.4.3 Topicality 
In addition to order-of-mention and grammatical role, it has been suggested that 
the linguistic topic3 contributes to structural salience of entities (e.g., Givón, 1983; 
Lambrecht, 1994). Lambrecht (1994: 118) defined the term (sentence/clause) topic 
pragmatically in the following way: “The topic of a sentence is the thing which the 
proposition expressed by the sentence is ABOUT“. The topic is thus at the centre or 
focus of people’s attention in discourse, and the sentence describes the proposition(s) 
about this topic in a given situation (see also e.g., Gundel, 1976). However, the above 
definition differs from the one proposed for example by Givón (1983), who allows 
the term topic to refer to any participant in the discourse, and does not make a 
principled distinction between topical and non-topical participants. Because of its 
central role in the situation described by the sentence, the topic is often referred to as 
discourse topic or psychological or discourse focus4 (e.g., Garrod & Sanford, 1982; 
Grosz & Sidner, 1986; Gundel, 1999, 2008; Gundel, Hedberg, & Zacharski, 1993). 
These terms highlight the cognitive role of the participant constituting the topic: it is 
either currently under a focal attention and thus accessible as a referent for the 
following pronoun (Gundel, 1999, Gundel & Hedberg, 2008; Gundel, Hedberg, & 
Zacharski, 1993) or it holds a special role by having a strong representation in 
memory and is thus available as a referent for the pronoun (Foraker & McElree, 
2007).  
The grammatical subject in English is generally the topic, and thus the topic is 
often described in relation to the grammatical subject (Chafe, 1976; Lambrecht, 
1994). However, being a grammatical subject or topic means two different things, and 
therefore, these two concepts are not necessarily related. For example, in Finnish, 
                                                           
3 The term linguistic topic refers to the sentence and clause topic. 
4 Note that in linguistics the term focus is often used to refer to newly introduced information 
in the text and often occurs in sentence-final position rather than sentence-initial position in 
both English and Finnish (Chafe, 1976; Hakulinen, Karlsson, & Vikuna, 1980; see however 
Gussenhoven, 2007, for the role of prosody in focus assignment in English and Vainio & 
Järvikivi, 2006, for Finnish). Therefore, psychological or discourse focus do not refer to the 




which has a relatively free word order, the topic is more often related to the first-
mentioned position than the grammatical subject (Vilkuna, 1989). For example, in 
both (27) and (28) the topic is John; however, while John is the grammatical subject 
in the former example, it is the grammatical object in the latter.  
 
(27) John potkaisi Maryä laiturilla. [SVO] 
‘John (SUBJ) kicked Mary (OBJ) at the pier’ 
 
(28) Johnia potkaisi Mary laiturilla. [OVS] 
 ‘John (OBJ) kicked Mary (SUBJ) at the pier’ 
 
As can been seen from the above definitions of topic, it can be challenging to 
differentiate it from factors such as order-of-mention or grammatical role; instead, it 
often co-occurs with at least one of these factors. This makes it difficult to determine 
which of these factors is contributing to the salience of antecedents in pronoun 
resolution. Instead, it is likely that some of the effects that are assumed to be the 
result of order-of-mention or grammatical role are in fact influenced by topicality as 
well (e.g., Arnold, 2000, 2005, 2007; Gordon et al., 1993; Järvikivi et al., 2005; 
Kaiser & Trueswell 2008, in press; Song & Fisher, 2005, 2007). 
In sum, factors such as order-of-mention, grammatical role and topic have been 
shown to contribute to discourse/structural salience or prominence and thus also to 
pronoun resolution by making the first-mentioned character, grammatical subject and 
the topicalised character the preferred antecedent for a subsequently presented 
pronoun. In addition, it seems rather difficult to clearly disentangle these properties 
from each other and thus to know which of them plays the key role in anaphor 
resolution. In order to take advantage both of these findings and of the fact that it is 
difficult to differentiate between the factors, in the current experiments these factors 
were mapped together to form a “structurally” highly salient referent that in turn can 
be pitted against the semantically most plausible referent in backward inferencing. 
Thus, it is possible to have two referents, one that is the structurally preferred and 
another that is the semantically preferred antecedent (or both structurally and 
semantically preferred/dispreferred) for the ambiguous pronoun. Because the above-
mentioned discourse/structural factors are not differentiated from each other in the 
current studies, I refer to these factors with the combined term discourse/structural 
cues. 
 
1.5 Research questions and hypotheses  
The focus of the present set of studies was to investigate the importance of 
semantics during inferential processes: to investigate whether semantics is activated 
elaboratively during discourse comprehension and what its relative importance is in 
backward inferencing compared to discourse/structural cues. In the previous research, 
these questions have remained unresolved partly due to limitations of previously used 
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methods. Thus, introducing a novel method was crucial. I employed the visual world 
eye-tracking method that involves the recording of participants’ eye movements to 
visual scenes while they are listening to spoken language (see a detailed description 
of the method in Chapter 2). This method allowed me to disentangle backward and 
forward inferencing and also to tap into the time course of semantic and 
discourse/structural effects. In the following, I introduce the research questions and 
the hypotheses derived from the earlier literature. Detailed descriptions of the studies 
are provided in Chapter 3. 
Elaborative activation of semantics. Forward activation of semantic information 
was studied in two experiments investigating two different aspects of semantics, 
gender stereotypes and implicit causality. Study I tested the elaborative activation of 
generically presented gender stereotype information in Finnish. Mental Models 
approaches allow general world knowledge such as stereotypes to become activated 
incrementally during the course of processing and thus elaborative activation is 
predicted (e.g., Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
However, such activation in not predicted by the Minimalist Account as it allows only 
information that contributes to local coherence or is readily available in short-term 
memory to become activated in a forward fashion (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 
1992). Measuring participants’ eye movements toward male and female characters 
while they heard a gender stereotype role name such as chimney sweep  (a male 
stereotype) or make-up artist (a female stereotype) was expected to reveal whether 
listeners activated gender stereotype information elaboratively: For example, 
following the word chimney sweep, it was expected that if stereotype information is 
activated, the probability of fixating a male character is higher than the probability of 
fixating a female character; and vice versa following a female stereotype name.  
Another aspect of semantics that was used to study whether elaborative inferences 
are activated online was implicit causality. Study II was designed to constrast the 
predictions of the Clausal Integration Account and the Immediate Focusing Account. 
The former proposes that implicit causality is not activated elaboratively, but instead 
is activated later when implicit causality information in the main clause is integrated 
with the explicitly stated causal information in the subordinate clause (Garnham, 
2001; Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000). The latter assumes that implicit 
causality can become activated even prior to the pronoun by highlighting one of the 
characters (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; MacDonald 
& MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 2007). This question 
was studied by using Finnish as it allowed a good control over the implicit causality 
verbs: both NP1- and NP2-biased verbs were formed from the same stem (e.g., 
pelottaa ‘frighten’ and pelätä ‘fear’). As in the gender stereotype study, the fixation 
probabilities to the two characters, referred to by NP1 and NP2, were calculated 
following the NP1-biased and NP2-biased verbs. If implicit causality information is 
activated prior to the pronoun, as suggested by the focusing account, fixation 
probabilities to the bias-consistent character should be higher than to the bias-
inconsistent character. Such a preference should not be observed if implicit causality 
is activated only following an explicit prompt realised by a later occurring pronoun 
(or even later), as suggested by the integration account. In order to further test the 
question of whether an explicit trigger such as the presentation of causal conjunction 
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because is needed to activate implicit causality, fixation probabilities were also 
measured prior to and following the causal conjunction onset that followed later in the 
sentence context. Some earlier studies have proposed that the activation of implicit 
causality information does not occur without a causal connective (e.g., Koornneef, 
2008; Stevenson et al., 1994; Stevenson, Knott, Oberlander, & McDonald, 2000; see 
however McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995). However, if such a prompt is not needed 
for activation of implicit causality information, fixation probabilities to the bias-
consistent character should be higher than to the bias-inconsistent character even prior 
to the causal conjunction. 
Importance of semantics in backward inferencing. Backward use of semantics 
was tested in two different conditions: it was pitted against discourse/structural 
prominence in Studies II, III and IV, while in Study IV the relative information was 
presented after an anaphoric expression in order to see whether an additional 
inference would be made to revise the earlier resolved anaphoric expression. 
Study II tested the importance of implicit causality information compared to 
structural cues when processing the gender ambiguous third person pronoun hän 
‘s/he’ in Finnish. It was hypothesised that even though implicit causality may already 
become activated prior to the pronoun (see above) it does not automatically lead it to 
have a privileged role in pronoun resolution. Instead, it may be possible that implicit 
causality is competing with discourse/structural cues and that its importance is 
weighed against the strength of the other cues. Note however that this assumption is 
not in line with the strict interpretation of the Immediate Focusing Account as it 
assumes a priority role for the referent that is highlighted by the implicit causality 
information (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; Van 
Berkum et al., 2007). In other words, the Immediate Focusing Account assumes that 
implicit causality should be the preferred cue in pronoun resolution regardless of the 
strength of other competing cues. A structurally salient character was introduced prior 
to the pronoun: the character was the combined first-mentioned character, 
grammatical subject and a shifted topic. Having the structurally salient character not 
only as a topic but also as a shifted topic, we increased its salience in the discourse 
(e.g., Bestgen & Vonk, 2000; Vonk et al., 1992). This cue was contrasted with 
implicit causality information in order to study which one of these cues was more 
pronounced in pronoun resolution. In order to do so, the fixation probabilities toward 
the structurally preferred antecedent were compared to the probabilities toward the 
semantically preferred antecedent during the course of processing following the 
pronoun: If listeners prefer structural cues, the probability of fixating the structurally 
preferred antecedent should be high, irrespective of whether the antecedent is 
semantically preferred or not. Similarly, if listeners prefer semantic cues, the 
probability of fixating the semantically preferred antecedent should be high, 
irrespective of whether the antecedent is structurally preferred or not. In addition, if 
implicit causality has a privileged role as suggested by the Immediate Focusing 
Account, the effect should be found very shortly following the pronoun and even 
prior to the discourse/structural effects.  
In Study III another approach was adopted. As discussed in the Introduction, 
structural factors have been found to play an important role also in children’s pronoun 
resolution. However, the question of whether children are also sensitive to semantic 
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cues during pronoun resolution has remained unstudied. In order to shed light on this 
question and also to contribute to the discussion of when semantic and 
discourse/structural cues are acquired during language development, semantic cues 
were contrasted with structural cues in a study with three-year-old children. Although 
it would have been interesting to study effects of gender stereotype information or 
implicit causality similarly to the adult studies, investigating these properties would 
have been problematic in child language studies. It would have been hard to find 
nouns for which children have gender stereotypes. Similarly, implicit causality verbs 
have been found to be rather infrequent in child language or in child-directed speech; 
thus, they do not form an ideal basis for testing semantic effects on children’s 
pronoun resolution (Serratrice & Kidd, in preparation). A corpus investigation of 
child-directed speech in English revealed that transitive verbs are frequently used and 
would thus be better suited for testing semantic effects in children’s pronoun 
resolution than gender stereotypes or implicit causality.  
Study III investigated the effects of verb transitivity and proto-roles on pronoun 
resolution. As in the studies mentioned above, two potential antecedents for an 
ambiguous pronoun were introduced and their semantic and discourse/structural 
preferences were manipulated orthogonally. Based on the earlier literature, it was 
expected that when children hear the pronoun he after a high transitivity verb (e.g., 
hit), both the subject and object would be considered highly prominent candidates for 
an antecedent because they both exhibit several proto-role properties (Dowty, 1991; 
Hopper & Thompson, 1980; Kako, 2006). In contrast, following a low transitivity 
verb, for which neither the subject nor the object exhibit many proto-role properties, 
both the subject and object are less prominent candidates for an antecedent. However, 
with these verbs it was hypothesised that the subject was more accessible as an 
antecedent for the pronoun than the object. This is because the objects of low-
transitive verbs (e.g., see) do not exhibit any of the prototypically object-like 
properties. The probability of fixations toward the target characters following the 
pronoun were expected to reveal whether 3-year-old children are sensitive to semantic 
cues. If they are not, only a first-mention subject preference was expected (based on 
earlier findings of Song & Fischer, 2005, 2007). 
In Study IV, the focus was again on gender stereotype information. In this 
experiment it was of interest to test whether two different types of backward 
inferences, anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences are affected by semantic 
information to the same extent. It has been suggested that because anaphors explicitly 
trigger a matching process with their possible antecedents, the semantically most 
appropriate antecedents may be preferred (Greene et al., 1992). Thus, it was 
hypothesised that semantic information may play a strong role in anaphor resolution. 
However, whether semantic information also plays such a strong role during non-
anaphoric inferencing is not clear. Earlier studies suggest that salient discourse 
entities are easier to retrieve than less salient entities  (e.g., McKoon et al., 1996; 
O’Brien, Albrecht, Hakala, & Rizzella, 1995; O’Brien, Plewes, & Albrecht, 1990), 
and thus it may be that when an active matching process is not prompted by an 
anaphor (non-anaphoric inferencing), discourse/structural salience might be an 
equally strong or even stronger cue than semantic information. In Study IV the use of 
gender stereotype information in comparison to the use of discourse/structural cues 
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were investigated when participants processed ambiguous gender stereotypical NPs 
that were presented either with or without an anaphoric marker (moottoripyöränsä 
‘his/her motorcycle’ vs. moottoripyörän ‘motorcycle’). Measuring participants’ eye 
movements toward stereotypically consistent vs. inconsistent and structurally 
preferred vs. dispreferred characters during both anaphoric and non-anaphoric 
inferences, it was possible to test the strength of semantic cues: Based on the above 
assumptions, it was expected that the use of semantic and discourse/structural cues 
could differ in the anaphoric and non-anaphoric conditions. 
In addition, the question of whether people draw additional inferences (i.e. after 
making an anaphoric inference) based on semantic information was motivated by a 
prediction derived from the Minimalist Account. The account suggests that people 
draw only a minimal number of inferences in discourse, and thus, if one inference is 
already successfully drawn, there should be no need for additional inferences 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992). Therefore, it was hypothesised in Study I 
that an ambiguous anaphoric expression would initially be resolved by using the 
highly salient discourse/structural cues (a combination of order-of-mention, 
grammatical role and topicality). According to the minimalist account, this 
information should be enough to build a coherent interpretation and the subsequently 
presented gender stereotype information should not be needed to make additional 
inferences. In order to test this hypothesis, a gender stereotype noun was presented 
following an anaphoric verb phrase. Importantly, the anaphoric verb phrase may be 
resolved by using the discourse/structural cues and thus there would not be a need for 
additional inferences. However, if gender stereotype words invite additional 
inferences, it was expected that participants would start fixating the stereotypically 
consistent character irrespective of whether that was structurally preferred or not. 
In sum, four studies tested the importance of semantics during forward and 
backward inferencing in discourse. Three different aspects of semantics, gender 
stereotypes, implicit causality and proto-roles, were used in order to investigate 
effects of different aspects of semantics, thus making it possible to draw more general 
conclusions about the use of semantics in discourse processing than would have been 
possible by studying only one aspect. In all studies the importance of semantics was 
also tested against discourse/structural cues in order to determine the relative strength 
of the semantic cues. Finally, Study III further expanded the scope of the studies to 
child language comprehension by investigating an aspect of semantics that 3-year-old 





In this chapter I review previous methods that have been used to study inference 
generation during online processing and point out challenges involved in using these 
methods when trying to disentangle forward and backward inferencing. I begin by 
introducing the visual world eye-movement method and explain how linking visual 
attention and spoken language can be helpful in understanding inferential processes. 
Moreover, I explain how the visual world method was employed in studies of 
inferences in this thesis and what kinds of spoken and visual stimuli were used and 
how the experiments were conducted. Finally, I explain the methods used in the pre-
tests for selecting stereotypically male- and female-biased role names (Study I) and 
nouns (Study IV), subject- and object-biasing implicit causality verbs (Study II), and 
high and low transitive verbs (Study III). 
 
2.1 Earlier methods to study online inferencing  
As noted in the Introduction, many different behavioural and neurocognitive 
methods have been used in order to understand inference generation during discourse 
processing. These methods have provided a great amount of important information on 
the kinds of inferences people draw during online language processing and how 
different structural and semantic factors affect these processes. However, many of the 
earlier used methods have turned out to be problematic for distinguishing between 
forward and backward inferencing during natural discourse processing.  
Measuring reading times. Two different reading time measures, self-paced reading 
and eye movement recording during reading, have been employed in studies of online 
inferencing. In self-paced reading, participants are asked to press a button in order to 
proceed to the next sentence (sentence-by-sentence self-paced reading) or to the next 
word (word-by-word self-paced reading), while in the eye movement recording 
participants are allowed to read the text on the computer screen without the additional 
requirements of pressing a button. Both of these methods rely on the assumption that 
prolonged reading times reflect comprehension difficulties: For example, when people 
are asked to read two-sentence stories such as (29) or (30), reading times for the 
personal pronouns have been found to be prolonged in (29) when the gender of the 
pronoun mismatches with the female gender stereotype information of its antecedent 
secretary, compared to reading times in (30) in which the pronoun matches with the 
gender stereotype information of its antecedent (e.g., Kennison & Trofe, 2003). 
 
(29) The secretary distributed an urgent memo. He made it clear that work 
would continue as normal. 
 
(30) The secretary distributed an urgent memo. She made it clear that work 
would continue as normal. 
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Both of the reading methods are dependent on an experimental manipulation in 
which a part of the discourse (e.g., a pronoun) mismatches with the previous context 
(such as in 29). When such mismatch is not present, as is the case with the gender-
ambiguous Finnish pronoun hän ‘s/he’ in the context John kätteli Marya. Hän... 
(‘John shook hands with Mary. S/he…’), the pronoun can refer to either of the 
characters, and it is difficult to make predictions about how reading times would be 
affected when people relate the pronoun to the first mentioned male character or the 
second mentioned female character; i.e., the reaction times do not reveal whether the 
pronoun is resolved as referring to John or Mary. 
More importantly, measuring reading times at or after the pronoun in (29) and (30) 
fails to be informative with regard to whether the gender stereotype information 
associated with secretary is activated when first encountering the word in the 
discourse or only later when the pronoun needs to be integrated into the preceding 
context. Thus, reading times for the inconsistent pronoun cannot differentiate between 
elaborative stereotype activation and later integration. Instead, the prolonged reading 
times at the pronoun may be due to the earlier activated gender stereotype information 
mismatching with the pronoun (secretary – he) or due to an integration effect 
prompted by the pronoun: the pronoun he makes people to look for the male 
antecedent and the failure to find one causes the processing cost. 
Of reading time methods, eye movement recording during reading has an 
advantage in comparison to the self-paced reading paradigm, as reading times can be 
divided into more fine-grained measures, such as first fixation duration, first-pass 
fixation time and regression path duration, which reflect different stages in the 
processing time course. In addition, as mentioned earlier, eye movement recordings 
allow participants to read text quite naturally without requiring button presses in order 
to advance through the text. Because of these advantages, eye movement 
measurements make it possible to study how early during processing different 
structural and semantic factors exert an effect on bridging inferences. 
Neurocognitive methods. In neurocognitive studies of online inferencing similar 
challenges may be faced. A popular method for studying online inferencing is the 
recording of event related potentials (ERPs). For ERP measurements, small voltage 
fluctuations of electric pulses are measured from the scalp produced in response to 
events of interest. These voltage differences are averaged across many trials to 
produce an event-related potential. The advantage of this method is that electric 
pulses appear on the scalp very quickly after linguistic information is processed in the 
brain; thus, the method provides a very good timing accuracy. Even though the ERP 
method has turned out to be very helpful for studying online language processing, the 
basic experimental design needed to make interesting comparisons relies on a similar 
mismatch between a pronoun and its antecedent, as described above in relation to 
reading time studies. Thus, similar to reading times measures, ERP studies have not 
been able to differentiate between forward activation of semantic information and the 
use of semantic information in backward inferencing.  
In ERP studies, two components, the N400, a negative peak in the waveform 
around 300-500 ms after target onset, and the P600, a positive peak around 500-700 
ms post-target have been associated with semantic and syntactic integration 
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processes, respectively (see Kutas & Federmeier, 2007, for an overview of ERP 
components). However, it is relatively unclear what component would represent 
inferential integration (e.g., Van Berkum et al., 2007). One component that has been 
found when comparing the processing of an ambiguous and unambiguous anaphor is 
referred to as the “Nref”, which is the negative peak around 300 ms after the target 
onset and is observed for ambiguous referents in the anterior sites of the brain (Van 
Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999a). However, there is yet no consensus on whether 
this component is reference-specific or even specific to language processing. More 
importantly, the previous evidence does not explain whether Nref is a neural correlate 
for just simply noticing that the pronoun is ambiguous, whether it reflects an active 
resolution of the antecedent, or keeping the possible referents active in memory until 
they become disambiguated (see Van Berkum et al., 2007, for further discussions). 
Therefore, even though the ERP paradigm provides a helpful tool for answering 
questions concerning online inferential processing, more studies are needed to specify 
the components that reflect different aspects of predictive and integrative processes 
during inferencing.  
Probe recognition task. Many earlier studies of inferencing have employed probe 
recognition tasks in which participants are reading (or listening to) linguistic stimuli 
and are occasionally interrupted and asked to judge whether the probed word was 
presented in the previous linguistic context, or to decide whether the target word is a 
word or not, or whether it was mentioned in the preceding linguistic context. By 
measuring reaction times to probes, it is possible to make inferences about the degree 
of activation of the target word at a certain point during discourse processing. Even 
though this method has been found to be indicative of the kind of information people 
use to draw inferences during online language comprehension, it has also been argued 
that the probe recognition task interrupts the normal language comprehension process 
and places a relatively large memory load on the comprehender, as well as invites 
readers to concentrate on surface features of the text at the expense of meaning 
processing (for a discussion, see e.g., Arnold et al., 2000). Moreover, it has been 
suggested that the method may also invite processing strategies different from normal 
(uninterrupted) language processing (Gordon, Hendrick, & Foster, 2000). 
Lexical decision method. In addition to the above-mentioned online methods, the 
lexical decision paradigm with priming has also been used to study activation of 
semantic information. In this task, a speeded response is made to target words 
presented following a prime word in isolation of any discourse context. For example, 
it has been used to study whether gender stereotypes are activated elaboratively (e.g., 
Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Oakhill et al., 2005). Even though these studies suggest that 
people do activate gender stereotype information elaboratively, the results are not 
directly generalisable to language comprehension in context. 
As discussed above, several methods have been successfully employed to study 
online inferences. Like any method, the aforementioned reading time, ERP, probe 
recognition and lexical decision methods have limitations when applied to the study 
of inference generation during online discourse processing – especially elaborative 
activation of semantic features. Therefore, it is of importance to develop methods that 
can be used to study online inferencing, and especially, to disentangle elaborative 
activation from integrative processing. The visual world eye-tracking method 
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(Cooper, 1974; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard & Sedivy, 1995) is a 
relatively new method that has the potential to serve this purpose. 
 
2.2 The current approach: The visual world method 
The visual world eye movement method has its basis in the seminal study of 
Cooper (1974), who measured participants’ eye movements to pictures while they 
were listening to spoken stories referring to those pictures. He found that the eyes 
tend to move in a (nearly) automatic fashion to the objects of the viewed scene when 
they were referred to in spoken language. The method has more recently been 
employed by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) by using a modern eye-tracking recording 
technique. In their study of syntactic ambiguity resolution, Tanenhaus et al. (1995) 
confirmed that there is a close link between spoken language comprehension and eye 
movement behaviour. Moreover, they demonstrated that by measuring people’s eye 
movements to the visual environment it is possible to make inferences about online 
language comprehension. In their studies, participants were asked to move around 
objects based on spoken instructions such as (31), which is temporarily ambiguous at 
the time when the phrase on the towel is uttered. The phrase can be interpreted as the 
goal where the apple should be moved to or as a modifier indicating where the apple 
that should be moved is currently located.  
 
(31) Put the apple on the towel… (in the box) 
 
When the visually depicted referents included only one apple, participants initially 
adopted the goal interpretation when they heard on the towel, as indicated by an 
increased probability of fixating an empty towel. However, when the visually 
depicted referents included two apples, one of which was on a towel, participants 
initially adopted the modifier interpretation, as indicated by an increased probability 
of fixating the apple that was on the towel. The study showed that eye movements to 
visually depicted objects may be informative in resolving what kind of interpretation 
is initially adopted when people comprehend ambiguous structures in spoken 
language (Eberhard, Spivey, Sedivy, & Tanenhaus, 1995; Spivey, Tanenhaus, 
Eberhard, & Sedivy, 2002; see also Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill, & Logrip, 1999, for 
similar findings with children). 
Later studies have further confirmed the close link between spoken language 
comprehension and eye-movement behaviour. For example, studies on word 
recognition have employed simple instructions such as Click on the TARGET WORD. 
Now put it below… These studies have shown that listeners rapidly direct their eyes 
towards the intended picture or their phonological or visual competitor (such as a 
beetle after hearing beagle or a rope after hearing snake, respectively) generally 
within 300 ms from the spoken word onset (e.g., Allopenna, Magnuson, & 
Tanenhaus, 1998; Dahan, Magnuson, & Tanenhaus, 2001; Dahan & Tanenhaus, 
2005; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, Chambers, & Carlson, 1999). Considering that it takes 
approximately 200 ms to plan and execute a saccade (e.g., Matin, Shao, & Boff, 
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1993), this demonstrates that eye movements are tightly time-locked to the processing 
of linguistic material. 
Since the Tanenhaus et al. (1995) study the visual world eye movement method 
has captured a lot of attention and has successfully been employed to investigate a 
variety of research topics related to language comprehension, production and dialogue 
(see e.g., Tanenhaus, 2007, for an overview). The following two subsections discuss 
how visual attention is linked to spoken language comprehension and inferencing as 
well as introduce different types of tasks used with this method. Finally, I explain 
how this method was employed in the current studies of inference processing during 
spoken language comprehension.  
 
2.2.1 Linking visual attention and spoken language  
It is widely assumed that attention has an important role in eye movement 
guidance during inspection of visual environments. Fixations are used as an overt 
measurement of information people are attending to at a given moment. Thus, eye 
movements to objects available in the visual environment are expected provide a 
window to attentional processes (e.g., Findlay, 2004; Irwin, 2004). In 
psycholinguistic studies the allocation of attention to certain objects at any given 
moment is measured in order to make interpretations of the cognitive processes 
underlying spoken language comprehension. Linking hypotheses of the coordination 
of visual attention and spoken language explain the dynamic interaction between 
these two modalities.  
Recently, two types of hypotheses for the linking of visual attention and spoken 
language processing have been introduced and implemented in computational models 
(Altmann & Kamide, 2007, 2009; Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009; Crocker, Knoeferle, & 
Mayberry, in press, Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006, 2007; Mayberry, Crocker, & 
Knoeferle, 2009). Crocker et al. (in press) introduced a network called CIANet that 
models language comprehension in coordination with the visual environment. The 
model has as its basis the Coordinated Interplay Account (Knoeferle & Crocker, 
2006, 2007), a model that includes three separate processes for establishing 
interpretation of spoken language in coordination in the visual context: (i) searching 
for a referent, (ii) establishing a referent, and (iii) use of visual scene to confirm or 
alter the linguistic interpretation. In the first processing phase, the spoken language 
input guides attention to the scene, as a result of which people search for objects and 
establish reference to these objects and events and anticipate potential or likely up-
coming referents. In the last phase after people have attended to the (anticipated) 
referents, the scene information quickly influences the comprehension process by 
confirming or altering the currently built interpretation. The model also states that 
comprehension and attention allocation in the scene are closely time-locked so that 
the use of scene information for language comprehension may even take priority over 
other types of information, such as general world knowledge of typical events 
(Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006). Even though the processing phase (i) and (ii) can be 
conceptually distinguished, they do not necessarily occur serially, but instead in 
reality the processes may overlap and occur in parallel.  
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A slightly different approach is the computational model by Altmann and 
Mirkovic (2009). According to their view, the anticipated linguistic meaning and 
scene information are not distinguishable from each other; instead, they are seen to 
interact with each other through coindexation and subsequent updating of the 
linguistic meaning and scene information. In visual world studies, the visual world 
has been shown to people from the onset of the spoken stimuli or even prior to it. 
Thus, it is possible that identification and representation of the visual information 
precede spoken language. Later, linguistic input activates features of scene objects in 
the hearer’s mind, including affordances (information of how the objects interact with 
other objects in the real world), resulting in early eye movements to visually 
affordable (and anticipated) objects (Altmann, & Kamide, 2007, 2009). It is also 
highlighted that the nature of the visual world is not visual per se, but rather a mental 
representation formed by coordinating visual perception with spoken language and 
which is updated on the basis of the unfolding spoken language (see also Allopenna et 
al., 1998; Tanenhaus et al., 2000). 
Evaluation of the proposed linking hypotheses is especially important to explain 
the results of the studies in which visual information has been found to affect, 
constrain or alter interpretation processes such as in the seminal study by Tanenhaus 
et al (1995) and several later studies of language comprehension (e.g., Altmann & 
Kamide, 1999, 2007, 2009; Kamide et al., 2003; Knoeferle & Crocker 2006, 2007; 
Knoeferle et al., 2005). However, the visual world eye movement method can also be 
used as a method to investigate how people process linguistic information rather than 
study how visual information affects language comprehension. For example, in their 
pronoun resolution study, Järvikivi et al. (2005) presented two potential antecedents 
(George Bush and Tony Blair) of the ambiguous pronoun (he) in the visual stimuli, 
and importantly, the visually depicted pictures did not provide any cues on how to 
resolve the pronoun (see the examples 29-30 in Chapter 1.4.2, above). Instead, 
increased fixations to the characters were interpreted as reflecting how participants 
resolved the pronoun. Thus, the study took advantage of earlier findings showing that 
spoken language stimuli make people attend to pictures that are referred to in the 
linguistic context, but the visual stimuli did not create a bias that affected ongoing 
interpretation processes. 
The current experiments in the thesis were not planned to test different types of 
linking hypotheses. Instead, the visual stimuli were chosen such that they did not give 
any cues on what types of inferences should be made and when; instead, the 
probability of fixating one referent in the visual scene more than another provides a 
measure of what type of inferences are drawn during online comprehension. For 
example, the following patterns were of interest: do people fixate a stereotypically 
consistent character after hearing a stereotype word such as a secretary and do people 
fixate structurally or semantically preferred antecedents following an anaphor. 
 
2.2.2 Active and passive tasks  
As indicated above, the visual world method can be used in different ways. In 
addition to the potential role of the visual scene in comprehension processes, different 
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tasks are introduced. The tasks can be divided into two groups based on whether the 
task requires an additional motoric movement or not. In active tasks, participants are 
asked to perform a motor action based on spoken instructions such as put the apple in 
the box or click on the bacon. These experiments involve two tasks: Comprehension 
of the spoken language as well as planning and performing a motor action based on 
those instructions. Even though eye movements in these experiments have been found 
to be indicative of underlying language comprehension (people tend to fixate the 
visual referents of the spoken input), it is not always easy to interpret what 
proportions of the fixations are controlled by these language comprehension 
mechanisms and what proportions by the action planning mechanisms (e.g., Boland, 
2005). For example, Hayhoe & Ballard (2005) conducted an experiment using tasks 
that do not include any language comprehension, in which participants were asked to 
either search for an object or reach for an object. The probability of fixations was 
higher in the latter condition than in the former.  
A different type of visual world eye movement study, which uses passive tasks, 
mimics what comprehenders spontaneously do. In these tasks, people are not asked to 
perform any motoric movements; instead, they are only instructed to listen to the 
stories for comprehension. Participants may be explicitly instructed to attend to the 
pictures while listening to the stories (e.g., Järvikivi et al., 2005; Knoeferle & 
Crocker, 2007), or they are not given any direct instructions to relate the depicted 
pictures to the spoken stimulus (e.g., Altmann & Kamide, 1999, Experiment 2; 
Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006). This line of visual world experiments has employed 
different secondary tasks in order to make sure people follow the stories for 
comprehension. Examples of such tasks are a picture verification task (e.g., Altmann 
& Kamide, 1999, Experiment 1; Arnold, et al., 2000), comprehension questions 
(Arnold et al., 2007) or a continuation task in which people are asked to continue the 
story by using the words and pictures occurring in the task (Järvikivi et al., 2005). 
Interestingly, participants’ eye movement behaviour does not seem to be dependent 
on different instructions used in the passive versions of the visual world studies. For 
example, Altmann and Kamide (1999) showed that when people were given a picture 
verification task (Experiment 1) the pattern of eye movements were the same as when 
they were not specifically instructed to relate the pictures to the text (Experiment 2). 
In other words, people related the spoken language to the pictures even without 
specific instructions. This effect is also shown by Altmann (2004), who demonstrated 
similar eye movement behaviour even in the Blank screen paradigm in which the 
visual scene was presented only prior to the spoken stimulus and thus absent during 
the spoken language comprehension. 
The current studies employed the passive version of the visual world eye 
movement method in order to avoid potential additional effects of motoric tasks on 
eye movements. The methodological details are explained in the following chapter. 
 
2.3 Visual world method as employed in the thesis 
The inference studies in this thesis adapted the passive version of the visual world 
eye movement method. In Studies I, II and IV participants were asked to carefully 
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listen to the stories and at the same time follow with their gaze the pictures depicted 
on the screen, in the same order they appeared in the story. In addition, they were 
occasionally asked to continue the story by using the persons and places mentioned 
therein. The continuation responses were not recorded or analysed because they are 
not of theoretical interest; the task only ensured that participants listened to the stories 
for comprehension. Study III differed slightly in its instructions: Children were 
instructed to see who would do something silly and no continuation task or any other 
additional tasks were performed. The experiments took between 20 minutes (Study 
III) and 40 minutes (Study IV) to complete. 
 
2.3.1 Spoken and visual stimuli 
The spoken stimuli in the studies consisted of stories containing between two and 
four sentences. The stories were spoken by native speakers of Finnish (Studies I, II 
and IV) or a native speaker of British English (Study III). Recordings were carried out 
in the acoustic laboratories at the Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, University of 
Turku and at the School of Psychology, University of Dundee. The phonetic software 
Praat (Boersma, 2001) was used to record, edit and analyse the sound files. The 
stories were spoken as complete stories with a natural speech rate of 4-7 syllables per 
second and with natural sentence intonations avoiding unnatural prosodic features. 
The onsets of the critical target words for data analyses were determined on a trial-by-
trial basis determining the exact acoustic onsets for each target item in each study. 
Measuring was done using phonetic details of both the acoustic waveform and the 
visual spectrogram. 
In order to increase the phonetic control of potential prosodic variability over the 
materials, the stories used for Studies II and III were cross-spliced. In Study II one of 
the experimental conditions’ recording was selected as the base story (e.g., Condition 
1, see Example 39, Chapter 3.2) and other conditions were created by replacing the 
pronoun with another type of pronoun (e.g., hän ‘he’ with hänet ‘him’ in order to 
create Condition 2). Further conditions were created by replacing the verb in the base 
story (the verb pelkäsi ‘feared’ with pelotti ‘frightened’ in order to create Condition 
3) and by splicing a complete subclause into Condition 3 in order to create another 
condition (i.e., by splicing the subclause from Condition 2 into Condition 3). A 
similar procedure was used in Study III (see example stories in Figure 8, Chapter 3.3).  
In the studies of this thesis, the visual stimuli were neutral with respect to the 
linguistic stimuli; they did not bias towards a particular interepretation or inference 
(cf. Altmann & Kamide, 1999, 2007, 2009; Kamide et al., 2003; Knoeferle & 
Crocker, 2006, 2007; Knoeferle et al., 2005; Tanenhaus et al., 1995). In other words, 
the visual stimuli were designed not to give any obvious cues for what kinds of 
inferences to make in discourse and when. The visual stimuli comprised three or four 
pictures of the same size: photographs collected from the Internet in the adult studies 
(Study I, II and IV, see Figure 1) and colour drawings in the child study (Study III). 
The pictures were assigned to positions on the screen and their location was 
counterbalanced between items in order to avoid strategic effects that could have 
arisen if participants learnt the location in which a certain character (e.g. first-
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mentioned character or grammatical subject) always appeared; using this procedure it 
was also possible to avoid a situation in which some screen locations would 
potentially receive generally more fixations than other locations. The studies of adult 
language comprehension always displayed four pictures that included two 
(competing) target characters for investigating inferences and two other objects 
depicting locations mentioned in the linguistic context. The visual stimuli in the child 
study displayed three pictures:  two competing antecedents for the pronoun and a 
location. An example of the visual stimuli of Study I is provided in Figure 1 (see 
example of the stimuli of the child study in Figure 6 (Chapter 3.3). In the 
experimental procedure, the pictures appeared on the screen 50 ms before the sound 










Figure 1. An example of the type of visual stimuli used in Study I. 
 
2.3.2 Eye movement recording and coding for analyses 
Eye movements in all adult studies were recorded using an EyeLink II head-
mounted eyetracker manufactured by SR Research Ltd, Mississauga, Ontario, 
Canada. The eyetracker is a head-mounted near infrared video-based tracking system 
combined with hyperacuity image processing. The eyetracker samples pupil location 
at 500 Hz, thus providing a very fine-grained measure of eye locations on the screen. 
The spatial accuracy of the system is better than 0.5 degrees of arc. In all studies 
viewing was always binocular, but only one eye was recorded. The tracker was 
calibrated using a 9-point calibration grid; calibration was validated before each 
experiment and also during the experiment whenever necessary. Each trial was 
preceded by a fixation point that allowed the eye-tracking software to make a drift 
correction if necessary. Software for EyeLink developed in Saarbrücken was used to 
programme the experiments and prepare the data for analyses (see e.g., Knoeferle et 
al., 2005, for more information of the software). The visual scenes were accompanied 
with colour coded bitmap templates that corresponded to the picture areas on the 
screen. The software matched the colour coding with the x-y coordinates of the 
recoded fixations, so that it was possible to identify which of the pictures or a 
background participants were fixating at any given moment during the trials.  
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Children’s eye movements in Study III were videoed using a Panasonic NV-GS55 
mini DV digital video camera mounted on the centre top of a 50 x 30 cm coloured 
screen. In this experiment, the experimenter was present next to the child in order to 
help him/her to concentrate on the task. The eye movement data were coded by a 
research assistant blind to the hypotheses of the experiment using the INTERACT© 
video coding software.  
The fixation probabilities to the target characters were used as the dependent 
measure. As the main inferential statistic analyses, repeated measures analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) or hierarchical log-linear modeling were used. Detailed 
descriptions of the inferential statistical analyses are reported in the original 
publications (see the Appendix). 
 
2.4 Methods used in the pretests 
A variety of pretests were carried out with the experimental materials. For the two 
studies investigating gender stereotype biases of occupations/role names such as 
chimney sweep and make-up artist (Study I) or nouns such as motorcycle and apron 
(Study IV) were pretested. In total, 124 occupations and 100 nouns were pretested 
using a 7-point Likert scale with 1 indicating an extremely masculine and 7 an 
extremely feminine occupation/noun. For both studies, the 18 most masculine and 18 
most feminine occupations/nouns were selected for the experimental stimuli. The 











List of stereotypically male-biased and stereotypically female-biased role names  
selected for Study I. 
Male stereotype occupations Female  stereotype occupations 
asentaja 'mechanic' kassanhoitaja 'cashier' 
hautausurakoitsija 'funeral director' keittäjä 'cooker' 
kalastaja 'fisher(man)' kirjastovirkailija 'librarian' 
kivenhakkaaja 'stonecutter' kodinhoitaja 'home aid' 
korjaaja 'repairman' kosmetologi 'beautician' 
lentäjä 'pilot' kotiavustaja 'home help' 
maanviljelijä 'farmer' lähihoitaja  'hospital attendant' 
mekaanikko 'mechanic' matkaopas 'travel guide' 
metsästäjä 'hunter' meikkaaja 'make-up artist' 
muurari 'mason' ompelija 'dressmaker' 
nuohooja 'chimney sweep' parturikampaaja 'hairdresser' 
palotarjastaja 'fire inspector' sairaala-apulainen 'hospital attendant' 
seppä 'smith' sairaanhoitaja 'nurse' 
sotilas 'soldier' sihteeri 'secretary' 
teknikko 'technician' siivooja 'cleaning lady'/'cleaner' 
vahtimestari 'doorman'/'janitor' sisustussuunnittelija 'interior designer' 
yksityisetsivä 'detective' tanssija 'dancer' 
ylikonstaapeli 'police sergeant' tarjoilija 'waiter'/'waitress' 
TABLE 4 
List of stereotypically male-biased and stereotypically female-biased role names  
selected for Study IV. 
Male stereotype nouns Female stereotype nouns 
alkometri 'breathalyser' balettitossu 'ballet shoe' 
haalari 'overalls' esiliina 'apron' 
jääkiekkomaila 'hockey stick' hiusponnari 'hair clip' 
kitara 'guitar' huulirasva 'lip balm' 
moottoripyörä 'motorcycle' jumppapallo 'gymnastic ball' 
moottorisaha 'chain saw' käsikoru 'bracelet' 
nahkaliivi 'leather waistcoat' käsirasva 'hand cream' 
naulapyssy 'nail gun' korurasia 'jewel case' 
nyrkkeilyhanska 'boxing glove' korvakoru 'earring' 
peräkärry 'trailer' kynsiviila 'nail file' 
pilkkijakkara 'ice fishing seat' mankeli 'mangle' 
putkikassi 'sport bag' meikkipussi 'toilet bag' 
ruohonleikkuri 'lawn mower' neula 'needle' 
salibändymaila 'floorball stick' nilkkaketju 'ankle bracelet' 
sirkkeli 'circular saw' päiväkirja 'diary' 
taskukello 'pocket watch' siivousämpäri 'cleaning bucket' 
traktori 'tractor' silkkihuivi 'silk scarf' 
vasara 'hammer' sormuskello 'finger watch' 
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For Study II subject- and object-biasing implicit causality verbs were selected by 
using a sentence completion task that was also used in the earlier studies (Garvey & 
Caramazza, 1974). In total, 90 verbs were embedded in a sentence frame NP1 Verb 
NP2, because… Based on whether participants referred to the subject or object in 
their continuations, the 16 most subject and 16 most object biasing verbs were 
selected and used to create the linguistic materials for the experiment. Table 5 lists the 
used verbs.  
 
TABLE 5 
Subject- and object-biased implicit causality verbs selected for Study II. 
 
Subject-biasing verbs Object-biasing verbs 
epäilyttää 'make somebody suspicious' epäillä 'suspect' 
hämmästyttää 'amaze' hämmästellä 'be amazed'/'wonder' 
hätkähdyttää 'faze' hätkähtää 'startle' 
ihastuttaa 'delight' ihailla 'admire' 
ihmetyttää 'puzzle' ihmetellä 'marvel' 
inhottaa 'disgust' inhota 'detest' 
kauhistuttaa 'horrify' kauhistella 'be horrified' 
kavahduttaa 'startle' kavahtaa 'be startled' 
kummastuttaa 'puzzle' kummastella 'marvel' 
oudoksuttaa 'to be found strange' oudoksua 'find strange' 
pelottaa 'frighten' pelätä 'fear' 
säälittää 'make somebody pity' sääliä 'pity' 
surettaa 'distress' surra 'mourn' 
vihastuttaa 'anger' vihata 'hate' 
äimistyttää 'amaze' äimistellä 'be amazed'/'wonder' 
ällistyttää 'amaze' ällistellä 'be amazed'/'wonder' 
 
In order to assess the proto-role properties of the verbs for Study III, 30 reversible 
transitive verbs that occurred frequently in child directed speech in the Manchester 
Corpus on the CHILDES database (MacWhinney, 2000; Theakston, Lieven, Pine, & 
Rowland, 2001) were first selected. Transitivity of those verbs was tested by creating 
a questionnaire using some of the proto-role questions employed by Kako (2006, 
Experiment 1). Participants saw the verb embedded in nine questions presented in 
Table 6 and were asked to rate on a 7-point Likert scale the agent- and patient-like 
properties of the subject and object.  
The 10 verbs that had most agent- and patient-like properties were selected as the 
high transitive verbs (feed, pinch, phone, cuddle, squash, kiss, squeeze, kick, bang and 
hit) and the 10 verbs having the least agent- and patient-like properties represented 






An example of the transitivity rating questions for the verb chase. 
 
Given the sentence: Jane chased Kate 
(1) How likely is it that Jane chose to be involved in chasing? 
(2) How likely is it that Jane was aware of being involved in chasing? 
(3) How likely is it that Jane caused a change in Kate? 
(4) How likely is it that Jane caused Kate to do something? 
(5) How likely is it that Jane moved? 
(6) How likely is it that Jane existed before chasing took place? 
(7) How likely is it that Kate was changed in some way as a result of chasing? 
(8) How likely is it that Kate was created as a result of chasing? 
(9) How likely is it that Kate was stationary? 
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE ORIGINAL STUDIES 
This thesis consists of four separate studies, of which three have been accepted for 
publication in peer-reviewed journals and one will be submitted for publication. Studies 
I, II and IV were carried out at the University of Turku, Finland and Study III at the 
Max Planck Child Study Centre at the University of Manchester, United Kingdom.  
The studies examined the use of semantic information and structural factors in 
inference making. Studies I (Pyykkönen, Hyönä, & Van Gompel, 2009) and II 
(Pyykkönen & Järvikivi, 2009) tested both the elaborative activation of semantics as 
well as the use of semantic information in reference processing when making 
bridging inferences: Study I tested the elaborative activation of gender stereotypes 
during online processing and the use of gender stereotypes to revise coherence 
relationships, while Study II investigated the elaborative activation of implicit 
causality in pronoun resolution and how implicit causality competes with structural 
linguistic factors. Study III (Pyykkönen, Matthews, & Järvikivi, 2009) investigated 
the role of one important type of semantic information, proto-roles, in comparison to 
structural prominence, in pronoun resolution among children. Finally, Study IV 
(Pyykkönen, Van Gompel, & Hyönä, 2009) examined the importance of gender 
stereotype information and to discourse/structural salience in making two types of 
bridging inferences (anaphoric and non-anaphoric). 
All studies exploited the visual world eye-movement paradigm as the main 
methodology. A total of 232 participants took part in the studies: 98 undergraduate 
students in the eye movement experiments in Turku and 19 children in Manchester; in 
addition, 115 undergraduates from Turku and Manchester participated in the pretests 
on gender stereotypicality (Studies I and IV), implicit causality biases of verbs (Study 
II) and verb transitivity (Study III). 
 
3.1 Activation of gender stereotypes (Study I) 
Previous psycholinguistic studies have shown that gender stereotypes affect 
language comprehension in a backward fashion when resolving pronouns referring 
back to stereotyped words (e.g., secretary… s/he) (e.g., Duffy & Keir, 2004; Irmen, 
2007; Kennison & Trofe, 2003; Kreiner et al., 2008; Osterhout et al., 1997; Sturt, 
2003a,b). It has also been suggested that gender stereotypes are activated 
elaboratively in forward fashion during text comprehension (Garnham et al., 2002; 
Oakhill et al., 2005; Sanford, 1995; Reynolds et al., 2006). However, these previous 
studies have not been able to clearly differentiate between elaborative activation and 
backward use (in the form of bridging inferences) of gender stereotype information. 
Mental Models Theory and the Minimalist Account described in Chapters 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2 make opposite predictions regarding the above questions. Elaborative 
activation of gender stereotypes is predicted by Mental Models, which suggests that 
people build a mental representation of the situation in the world described by the text 
by using both explicitly stated information in the text and implicit information using 
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world knowledge such as stereotypes (e.g., Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Thus, when people encounter the word surgeon, they 
infer that this person is male even if this inference is not necessary to establish 
coherence in the text (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 2002; Sanford, 1985). 
However, this type of activation is not necessarily predicted by the Minimalist 
Account, which suggests that inferences that do not help to build local coherence in 
the text or are not readily available for the comprehender are not routinely made 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992).  
In addition, the Minimalist Account and Mental Models Theory make different 
predictions about the number of inferences created during online processing. The 
Minimalist Account suggests that comprehenders make a minimum number of 
inferences, only those necessary for establishing textual coherence (McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992). Therefore, it suggests that after people have made a 
bridging inference in order to integrate the currently processed information with the 
previous context, there is no need for additional inferences to revise the coherence 
relationship. However, Mental Models suggests that people update and modify the 
situation model in an incremental manner during discourse processing and therefore, 
such additional inferences do occur during online language processing (Garnham, 
2001; Garnham et al., 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).  
In Study I, the following questions were addressed: (1) Do listeners elaboratively 
activate gender stereotype information in role names during online spoken language 
comprehension? (2) Is gender stereotype information used to make additional 
inferences to revise an already established coherence relation? Short, three-sentence 
long stories in Finnish were presented auditorily to the participants. For example, 
when people were listening to Story (32) consisting of a stereotypically male role 
name chimney sweep, they saw pictures of a male and female character, a picture of 
an instrument mentioned in Sentence 2 (snow shovel), and a picture of the noun 
mentioned last in Sentence 2 (roof), see Figure 3 (Chapter 2.3.1).  
 
(32) Kuvissa näet Sinikan, 35-vuotiaan naisen Jyväskylästä ja Mikon, 40-
vuotiaan miehen Tampereelta. Pihatöiden lomassa Sinikka arvioi Mikon 
kanssa nuohoojan  kohtaamia vaaratilanteita liukkailla katoilla. 
Kouluttauduttaan nuohoojaksi hän oli oppinut monia keinoja hoitaa 
työnsä turvallisesti. 
 
 ‘On the screen you see Sinikka, a 35 year-old woman from Jyväskylä 
and Mikko, a 40 year-old man from Tampere. While doing year work 
Sinikka evaluated with Mikko the dangerous situations a chimney sweep 
gets into on slippery roofs. After having graduated to become a chimney 
sweep, s/he had learned many ways to work safely’ 
 
In the second sentence, a gender stereotype noun such as chimney sweep was 
presented generically, i.e., it referred to any chimney sweep rather than to a specific 
person; moreover, it co-referred with neither the female nor the male character 
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mentioned in the story. Therefore, an increased probability to fixate the male 
character after hearing chimney sweep would suggest that participants elaboratively 
activate the stereotype that chimney sweeps are usually male. Indeed, eye movements 
following the stereotype noun onset in the second sentence showed more fixations to 
the stereotypically consistent character (male in the above example) than to the 
stereotypically inconsistent character, providing evidence for elaborative activation of 
gender stereotypes, as suggested by Mental Models Theory (Garnham, 2001; 
Garnham et al., 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). The 




Figure 2. Elaborative activation of gender stereotypes in the second sentence of Study 
I. 
 
The third sentence tested whether people use gender stereotype information to 
revise an already established coherence relation (see Figure 3). The sentence started 
with an anaphoric verb (e.g., kouluttauduttuaan ‘after having graduated he/she’) 
followed by the same stereotype noun as in Sentence 2. The verb form contained a 
gender-ambiguous third person anaphoric suffix –AAN. The suffix indicates that the 
verb is related to one of the two characters mentioned in the story, but because 
Finnish lacks gender marking it can refer to either of them. In order to make one of 
the characters the preferred antecedent of the anaphoric verb, one of the two 
characters was made more salient by mentioning him/her before the other as the 
subject of the second sentence (e.g., Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1989; Järvikivi et al., 
2005; Kaiser & Trueswell, in press). Thus, comprehenders were assumed to interpret 
the anaphoric suffix as referring to the salient character, which should result in more 
looks to this character relative to the less salient character. This was confirmed by 
participants’ eye movements: They fixated the salient character more often than the 
less salient character when hearing the anaphoric verb. Interestingly however, during 
the following gender stereotype noun, people started to fixate the stereotypically 
consistent character more frequently than the inconsistent character – irrespective of 
whether this character was linguistically salient or not. This result confirmed that after 
comprehenders made a bridging inference using saliency information at the anaphoric 
verb, they subsequently revised it at the stereotype noun using gender stereotype 
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information. This finding does not fit well with the Minimalist Account, which 
suggests that people make only the minimum number of inferences in order to resolve 
local incoherence (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992), but the finding is in line 
with Mental Models Theory, which assumes that comprehenders make inferences 
continuously during discourse processing (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 2002; 




Figure 3. Stereotype effect in the third sentence of Study I. 
 
Figure 3 depicts the stereotype effect found in the third sentence. The result 
showed that people used both salience and gender stereotype information very 
quickly. The timing of the salience effect observed during the anaphoric verb implies 
that people did not wait until they heard the word-final anaphoric suffix before 
starting to build a link between the most salient character in the preceding context and 
the verb phrase. Similarly, the gender-stereotype effect at the stereotype noun was 
observed before the noun’s acoustic offset. These effects provide evidence for highly 
incremental language processing; people update their interpretation of the text at each 
word in order to achieve maximal coherence. I have named this the Principle of 
Maximal Coherence. According to this principle, people try to maximise coherence in 
the text by establishing and updating coherence relations as soon as they can by using 
a variety of coherence cues. This process explains why both salience and stereotype 
information had such rapid effects in Sentence 3.  
In sum, Study I showed that listeners activate gender stereotypes during online 
discourse processing even if this does not result in greater discourse coherence, as 
evidenced by the stereotype activation in Sentence 2. In addition, listeners also use 
gender stereotypes to update previously established coherence relations by making 
more inferences than would be necessary for coherence building. Study I also 
demonstrates that the visual-world eye-tracking method is a very useful method for 
studying both elaborative activation of semantic features as well as backward 
inferences during discourse comprehension and for disentangling these two processes 
from each other. 
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3.2 Activation and persistence of implicit causality (Study II) 
It has been debated at what point the causality information implicit in 
interpersonal verbs such as frighten and fear becomes activated in sentences such as 
John frightened Bill, because he… and John feared Bill, because he. Two opposing 
accounts have been suggested: According to the Immediate Focusing Account, 
implicit causality information is activated shortly after encountering an implicit 
causality verb, and it is used to focus one of the referents at the expense of the other, 
thus producing an effect on reference resolution immediately when a pronoun is 
encountered (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; 
MacDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum, et al., 2007). 
In contrast, much later activation of implicit causality information is suggested by the 
Clausal Integration Account, which states that implicit causality information has an 
effect on the comprehension process only during the clausal integration phase when 
implicit causality information in the main clause is integrated with the explicitly-
stated causal information of the subordinate clause (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 
1996; Stewart et al., 2000). 
These two accounts make different predictions about the activation of implicit 
causality information in discourse. The immediate focusing account predicts that a 
focusing effect due to activation of implicit causality information should already be 
measurable before the pronoun. In addition, it proposes that this focusing might lead 
to a prioritised use of this cue compared to structural cues when resolving a pronoun 
antecedent. In contrast, the clausal integration account suggests that implicit causality 
should not affect the relative activation of the potential antecedents until people have 
enough information to determine whether the information in the subordinate clause is 
in agreement or disagreement with the implicit causality bias expressed in the main 
clause.  
As previous studies have failed to clearly differentiate between the elaborative 
activation of verb semantics versus the later use of semantics during integration, 
Study II was carried out to examine whether (1) implicit causality information is 
activated on the basis of verb information prior to encountering the pronoun and the 
causal connective because; or whether (2) its activation occurs only after the pronoun, 
that is, when this information is needed to resolve the referential relationship between 
the ambiguous pronoun and its potential antecedents. The previous literature suggests 
that activating implicit causality prior to the pronoun makes it possible to use it as a 
focusing cue immediately at the pronoun in reference resolution. However, it has also 
been suggested that the activation of implicit causality information does not occur 
without causal connectives (e.g., Ehrlich, 1980; Stevenson et al., 1994, 2000). Thus, 
Study II also investigated as part of question (1) whether activation of implicit 
causality information occurs prior to the conjunction koska ‘because’ (see 33 below) 
or only after it but still prior to the pronoun.  
Participants listened to stories such as (33) in Finnish while their eye movements 
to the picture of a guitarist and a butler (in addition to pictures of two locations 
mentioned in the story) were measured. In order to answer question (1), the second 
sentence contained a subject biasing stimulus-experience verb or object biasing 
experiencer-stimulus verb created using the same verb stem.  
Overview of the Original Studies 
 58
(33) Kitaristi oli valmistautumassa illan esitykseen. Hovimestari 
pelkäsi/pelotti kitaristia ravintolasalissa, koska koko päivän hän 
(hänet) kummallista kyllä oli…. 
 
‘The guitarist was preparing for the night’s performance. The butler 
feared/frightened the guitarist in the dining room, because for the 
whole day s/he (or him/her5) curiously enough had…’ 
 
Eye movements to the target characters revealed that shortly following the verb 
people were more likely to fixate the bias-consistent character than the bias-
inconsistent character, as shown in Figure 4. Following the verb onset, the probability 
of fixating the subject character that was just mentioned was high following both 
subject- and object-biased verbs. However, shortly following the verb (900 ms from 
its onset) the probability of fixating the subject after subject-biased verbs remained 
higher than the probability of fixating the object. In addition, the fixations toward the 
object were similarly affected by the verb bias: the probability of fixating the object 
following object-biased verbs was higher than following subject-biased verbs. This 
finding supports the Immediate Focusing Account (Greene & McKoon, 1995; 
Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 2007) but 
provides evidence against the Clausal Integration Account (Garnham, 2001; Garnham 
et al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000). Interestingly, the activation of implicit causality 
information occurred even before the causal connective because. This result is 
inconsistent with previous results suggesting that activation of implicit causality does 
not occur without such a connective (e.g., Ehrlich, 1980; Stevenson et al., 1994, 2000; 
cf. McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995).  
Although implicit causality was activated following the verb and before the causal 
connective, this in itself does not necessarily imply that it is used when interpreting an 
ambiguous pronoun later in the sentence. In order to test the persistence of implicit 
causality and its use during pronoun resolution, the gender-ambiguous pronoun hän 
‘s/he’ or hänet ‘him/her’ was presented in the second clause of the target sentence. 
We investigated whether implicit causality has an effect only after structural 
information is used or whether it is used at the same time or even earlier than 
structural factors: Previous research has shown that ambiguous pronouns are 
preferentially interpreted as coreferential with the subject and first-mentioned 
antecedent of the preceding clause (Crawley et al., 1990; Frederiksen, 1981; 
Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988; Järvikivi et al., 2005) as well as with the 
antecedent that has the same grammatical role as the pronoun (e.g., Chambers & 
Smyth, 1998; Grober, Beardsley, & Caramazza, 1978; Sheldon, 1974; Smyth, 1994). 
Therefore, both the subject and the object form of the gender ambiguous 3rd person 
pronoun, hän 's/he' or hänet 'her/him' were used. In addition, in order to make the 
structural factors competitive with implicit causality information in pronoun 
resolution, a topic shift was introduced in the beginning of the second sentence: The 
first-mentioned subject and topic of the first sentence (e.g., guitarist, Example (33)) 
                                                           
5 The object pronoun hänet ‘him/her’ is grammatically correct in this position in Finnish.   
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was mentioned in the second sentence as a grammatical object, while a new entity 
was introduced as the first-mentioned subject and the linguistic topic (e.g. butler, 
Example (33)) and thus making it easily available as an antecedent, as suggested by 




Figure 4. Implicit causality effect from the acoustic onset of the implicit causality 
verb in Study II. 
 
Eye movements to the depicted characters following the pronoun onset revealed 
that even though implicit causality became activated prior to the pronoun and 
highlights one of the referents over another, this focusing may not function as a 
priority cue guiding pronoun resolution  - at least when the structural cues are strong 
enough (see Figure 5). Although an implicit causality effect was found during the first 
time segment (0-300 ms) following the pronoun onset, it is unlikely that this reflects 
any effect related to pronoun resolution as it takes around 200 ms to plan and execute 
a saccade (Matin et al., 1993). After this time segment, the main effect of implicit 
causality was absent until 900 ms after the pronoun onset. However, an interaction 
between implicit causality information and grammatical role were found already 600 
ms after the pronoun onset. The interaction showed an implicit causality effect for the 
first-mentioned subject but not for the object (see also McDonald & MacWhinney, 
1995; Stewart  & Gosselin, 2000; cf. Long & DeLay, 2000). It is likely that the 
privileged status of the first-mentioned entity (Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1988) and 
the topic shift (e.g., Bestgen & Vonk, 2000; Vonk et al., 1992) may have made it 
easier to detect the implicit causality effect with subject- than object-biasing verbs 
(see also Stewart & Gosselin, 2000). The difference in the information status of 
subjects versus objects caused by the topic shift may also have highlighted the main 
effect of grammatical role that was observed in all time windows, as evidenced by 
more looks toward subject than object entities. However, it is worth noting that the 
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effect of grammatical role did not differentiate between subjecthood, first-mention 
priority and topicality. 
Finally, the results following the pronoun onset did not show an interaction 
between implicit causality and pronoun type, indicating that implicit causality 
information had the same effect on pronoun resolution regardless of the pronoun type 
(hän ‘s/he’ vs. hänet ‘him/her’). On the other hand, the results showed an interaction 
between grammatical role of the antecedent and pronoun type, which is a replication 
of the effect of grammatical role parallelism (Chambers & Smyth, 1998; Smyth 
1994). Interestingly, this effect was observed after the implicit causality effect, which 
suggests that the use of implicit causality information is not delayed relative to the 




Figure 5. Interaction between implicit causality and pronoun type following the 
pronoun onset in Study II.  
 
In sum, Study II showed that implicit causality information is inferred and 
activated as soon as people hear an implicit causality verb in discourse and even 
before an explicit trigger of causality, such as the causal connective because is 
presented. Despite this early activation, implicit causality information may not have a 
privileged status in pronoun resolution, but may instead interact with, or be 
temporally masked by, other structural and discourse cues (such as a topic shift) used 
during the processing of pronouns. In addition, Study II provided further evidence 
that the visual world eye-tracking paradigm is a suitable method for investigating 
both forward and backward inferencing during online discourse processing.  
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3.3 Proto-roles in pronoun resolution (Study III)6 
Similarly to adults, there is evidence that young children are sensitive to structural 
factors when assigning antecedents to pronouns. However, it is unclear whether 
young children (aged three) are able to take advantage of semantic prominence due to 
the verb during referential processing. Therefore, I extended my research to children’s 
online language processing as well.  
Earlier studies of child language have failed to agree on the kinds of cues children 
use to draw inferences (Arnold et al., 2005, 2007; Song & Fischer, 2005, 2007). 
Previous evidence from pronoun resolution has revealed that children from age two 
onwards use cues like subjecthood and order-of-mention in assigning antecedents to 
ambiguous anaphors (Song & Fisher, 2005, 2007; but see Arnold et al., 2005, 2007). 
Importantly, these studies have not shown what kind of role semantics has during 
pronoun resolution. In Study III it was investigated whether children aged three are 
already sensitive to semantic cues during pronoun resolution.  
One aspect of semantics, namely transitivity of verbs (Dowty, 1991; Hopper & 
Thompson, 1980; Kako, 2006) was examined in Study III. It has been argued that one 
of the most basic semantic properties of verbs is transitivity (Hopper & Thompson, 
1980). The degree of transitivity of a given verb can be defined by how many 
prototypically agent-like or patient-like features, or proto-role properties, its 
arguments (subject and object) exhibit (Dowty, 1991; Kako, 2006). Hopper and 
Thompson (1980) have demonstrated that the lower the degree of transitivity of the 
verb is, the more backgrounded its arguments are in discourse; and, vice versa, the 
higher the transitivity of the verb, the more foregrounded, and therefore more 
accessible its arguments are.  
Children were presented with four-sentence stories in English, as illustrated in 
Figure 6. The critical pronoun occurred in the initial position in the third sentence (he 
did something very silly), which was identical across the different conditions of each 
story. Prior to the experiment the children were instructed by saying “Some of them 
might do something silly now. Let’s see who does something silly”. In addition, the 
first sentence was identical in the two conditions except for the order of the nouns 
phrases, which was counterbalanced by splicing the same verb into each story. 
 
 
                                                           
6 The discussion here refers to the accepted, final version of the article. Note that the appendix 
includes the original submitted version of the manuscript due to the copyright restrictions. 




Figure 6. Sequences of pictorial and linguistic simuli used in the high and low 
transitivity conditions in Study III. 
 
Based on the theories of proto-roles presented in the Introduction, it was 
hypothesised that when children hear the pronoun he after a high transitivity sentence, 
it is likely that both subject and object (the panda and the parrot in the story in Figure 
8) are highly accessible as antecedents for the pronoun as they exhibit several 
prototypically agent- and patient-like features. In contrast, following the low 
transitivity sentences, neither the subject nor object are semantically highly 
prominent, and are thus less accessible as antecedents as they do not exhibit many 
prototypically agent- or patient-like features. In other words, both subject and object 
are more foregrounded following the high transitive verbs than following the low 
transitive verbs. Moreover, unlike in the high transitive condition, as the objects 
following the low-transitive verbs did not exhibit many, if any at all, of the 
prototypically object-like properties, it was hypothesised that following the low-
transitive verbs, the subject (the panda in the story in Figure 6) would be more 
foregrounded and therefore more accessible as an antecedent for the pronoun than the 
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object (the parrot in the story in Figure 6). Thus, the difference between subjects and 
objects was expected to be larger in the low transitive than in the high transitive 
condition. Moreover, it was hypothesised that if children are sensitive to structural 
cues, they might show a general preference for the subject and first-mentioned 
character irrespective of the verb type.7 
Eye movements to the target characters confirmed the above hypotheses: With 
high transitivity verbs there were more looks toward both characters following the 
pronoun onset than in the low transitive condition. Low transitivity verbs stimulated 
less looking behaviour overall to the target characters than high transitivity verbs, and 
even more importantly, particularly towards the object of the low transitivity verb, as 
indicated by the interaction between structural and semantic prominence (see Figure 
7). This interaction was predicted based on the transitivity hierarchy (Hopper & 











Figure 7. Time course depicting both the main effect of transitivity and the interaction 
between transitivity and grammatical role as number of looks to subjects and objects 
in high and low transitivity conditions following the pronoun onset in Study III.  
 
In sum, Study III showed that children as young as three are able to take advantage 
of semantic prominence inherent in transitive verbs. Thus, Study III complements 
Study II by adding one more dimension to the list of semantic prominence factors that 
adults and children take into account during pronoun resolution. 
 
3.4  Gender stereotypes in anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences 
(Study IV)  
Even though anaphoric and non-anaphoric bridging inferences often serve the 
same purpose of establishing a coherent interpretation of discourse, it has been 
                                                           
7 Even though the last sentence, in which the referent was disambiguated, was not of interest, 
the disambiguated character was counterbalanced so that the first-mentioned subject was 
referred to equally as often as the second-mentioned object both in high and low transitivity 
conditions. 
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suggested that drawing anaphoric inferences differs from drawing non-anaphoric 
inferences (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Garrod, Freudenthal, & Boyle, 1994; Garrod et 
al., 1990; Greene et al., 1992; Fincher-Kiefer, 1995). Because anaphors explicitly 
signal the need for building a coherence relation, the process is assumed to be a 
matching process between an explicit anaphoric marker and the most plausible 
antecedent to create the semantically most appropriate text representation (Garrod et 
al., 1990; 1994). Therefore, it is hypothesised that semantic factors may play a more 
important role when resolving anaphoric expressions compared to making non-
anaphoric inferences. 
In Study IV gender stereotype information was pitted against salience cues in 
order to resolve the relative importance of the semantic cues during anaphoric and 
non-anaphoric inferences. Earlier studies suggest that both salience and gender 
stereotypes provide strong cues for anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences (Almor, 
1999; Gordon et al., 1993, Gordon & Scearce, 1995; Duffy & Keir, 2004; Kennison 
& Trofe, 2003; Kreiner et al., 2008; Osterhout et al., 1997; Sturt, 2003a,b). However, 
earlier studies have not tested the effect of gender stereotypes on anaphoric and non-
anaphoric inferences. Moreover, the effect of gender stereotypes has not been 
compared to the effects of other strong cues such as discourse/structural salience. 
Salience has been found to be important during anaphor resolution, but it has been 
hypothesised that it is important during non-anaphoric inferencing, given that salient 
discourse entities are easier to retrieve than less salient ones (e.g., McKoon et al., 
1996; McKoon, Ratcliff, Ward, & Sproat, 1993; O’Brien et al., 1990, 1995).  
Study IV tested the relative importance of semantics for making anaphoric and 
non-anaphoric inferences by comparing semantic effects to salience effects. 
Participants heard stories like (34). In these stories the last sentence always started 
with a gender stereotype noun like motorcycle. This word was presented either in the 
anaphoric or non-anaphoric form: The word either contained the anaphoric suffix -
(n)SA, which is a gender-ambiguous possessive anaphoric suffix signalling that the 
motorcycle is related to one of the previously mentioned characters, or contained no 
anaphoric suffix. Without the suffix, people had to draw a non-anaphoric bridging 
inference to relate the motorcycle to either of the characters.  
 
(34) Ruudulla ovat Äänekoskelta kotoisin oleva Sirpa ja Kauniaisista 
kotoisin oleva Sami. Syksyisellä iltanuotiolla Sirpa kommentoi Samin 
kanssa sitä, millaisia onnettomuuksia viime kesänä oli tapahtunut 
läheisellä metsätiellä. Moottoripyörän(sä) kolaroiminen oli aiheuttanut 
hänelle suuret taloudelliset vahingot. 
 
 ‘On the screen you will see Sirpa (female), who comes from Äänekoski 
and Sami (male), who comes from Kauniainen. In the fall around a camp 
fire, Sirpa talked with Sami about what kind of accidents happened last 
summer on the nearby forest road. Crashing (his/her) motorcycle caused 
him/her great financial damage.’ 
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The probability of fixating the female and male characters following the target 
word (motorcycle) showed that gender stereotype information was inferred quickly: 
the probability of fixating the stereotypically consistent character increased shortly 
following the stereotype word. In addition, the effect of discourse/structural salience 
was also found: people tended to look back to the character that was the most salient 
in the previous context.  
 Importantly however, the results also showed that the stereotype effect continued 
to be strong during later time windows when people were resolving anaphoric 
expressions, whereas in the non-anaphoric condition salience eventually 
outperformed gender sterotype information. These effects can be clearly seen from 
Figures 8 and 9, of which the former depicts the stereotype effect following the target 
word and the latter the structural salience effect following the target word, separately 




Figure 8. Time course of the semantic effects starting from the target onset when 












Figure 9. Time course of the discourse/structural salience effects starting from the 
target onset when making anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences in Study IV.  
 
These results lend support to the view that anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences 
differ during online discourse processing (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Garrod et al., 
1990, 1994; Greene et al., 1992; Fincher-Kiefer, 1995). Importantly, Study IV 
showed that semantic information plays a more important role during anaphoric 
inferencing than it does during non-anaphoric inferencing, whereas 
discourse/structural cues are more prominently used during non-anaphoric than 
anaphoric inferencing. This implies that the relative importance of semantic cues in 
comparison to discourse/structural cues is dependent on whether the inference is 
explicitly triggered by an anaphoric marker or not: When such a trigger is present, 





4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Section 4.1 highlights the relevance of the findings of the thesis with respect to the 
importance of semantics during inferencing, particularly elaborative activation of 
gender stereotypes, the role of implicit causality information, and interactions 
between semantics and other linguistic cues during backward inferencing. These 
findings suggest modifications for the current theories of language comprehension. 
Theoretical modifications are suggested in order to account for forward inferences in 
online processing as well as to account for the role of semantics in relation to other 
(discourse and structural) cues.  
 
4.1 Main findings and their theoretical implications 
The studies showed that people activate different types of semantic information 
elaboratively during online language processing (Studies I and II). In addition, the 
studies showed that semantics plays an important role in anaphor resolution (Studies 
II, III and IV), but also that anaphor resolution is sensitive to other 
discourse/structural cues (Study II). Furthermore, Study IV demonstrated a more 
pertinent role of semantics during anaphoric bridging inferences than non-anaphoric 
inferences. Finally, Study I demonstrated that semantic information is used quickly to 
revise earlier established coherence relationships. In the following, I will discuss 
these findings and their theoretical implications in detail. 
 
4.1.1 Elaborative activation of semantics 
Studies I and II showed that people activate semantic information elaboratively 
during online language comprehension. This finding was observed with respect to 
two types of semantic information: gender stereotypes and implicit causality.  
Activation of gender stereotypes. Consider the following example, which was also 
presented in the Introduction (Example 1): 
 
(35) The chimney sweep was climing onto the roof. He was worried 
whether it could be slippery.  
 
This example highlights an aspect of discourse that has been studied in 
psycholinguistics already for several decades, i.e., whether gender stereotypes are 
activated when encountering a stereotype word such as chimney sweep or only later 
when a subsequent pronoun referring to chimney sweep needs to be integrated with 
the antecedent in the preceding context. Earlier studies have failed to resolve whether 
gender stereotype information is activated when the word is first encountered in the 
discourse or only later at the point when the pronoun referring to the stereotype word 
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is assigned an antecedent (Duffy & Keir, 2004; Garnham et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 
2006, Sanford, 1985). Study I showed that when people heard a generic gender-
stereotype noun such as chimney sweep in a discourse, their visual attention was 
directed more toward a male than a female character depicted on the screen – even 
though it was impossible to infer that this particular character was a chimney sweep 
(see example 32, Chapter 3.1). This finding is taken as evidence for elaborative 
activation of gender stereotype information during discourse processing. 
Several earlier studies of gender stereotypes have also proposed that gender 
stereotypes are activated elaboratively in discourse (Carreiras et al., 1996; Garnham, 
2001; Garnham et al., 1996, 2002; Reynolds et al., 2006; Sanford, 1985). However, as 
noted earlier, due to methodological limitations, these studies have failed to present 
unequivocal evidence for such activation during online comprehension. Study I was 
the first to show that people do indeed activate them in a forward fashion and that 
their activation is not dependent on an explicit prompt such as a pronoun. The results 
from Study I also allowed us to extend the results from studies that showed that 
elaborative activation of gender stereotypes occurs when stereotype words are 
presented in isolation (Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Cacciari & Padovani, 2007; Oakhill et 
al., 2005) by showing that such elaborative activation also occurs during natural 
discourse processing.  
The elaborative activation of gender stereotypes is in line with Mental Models 
theories (e.g., Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998), which suggest that during online language comprehension people 
not only activate literally stated information but also general world knowledge such 
as stereotypes, and that they may do so elaboratively when encountering gender-
stereotype words in discourse. However, elaborative activation of gender stereotypes 
is not predicted by the Minimalist Account (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992), 
which suggests that inferences that do not help building local coherence in the text are 
not routinely made. As mentioned in the Introduction, according to the Minimalist 
Account only those inferences for which the relevant information is ‘readily 
available’ are made (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). Even though it is not completely 
clear what exactly ‘readily available’ means and how readily available gender 
stereotypes are in the comprehender’s mind, it can be argued that our findings are not 
consistent with this hypothesis: McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) restricted readily 
available information to include the explicitly stated words in the current or 
immediately preceding context and the propositions derived from them that are held 
in short-term memory (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978). As gender stereotypes cannot be 
derived from text propositions, it can be argued that they do not belong to the 
category of ‘readily available’ in the Minimalist Account and thus should not have 
been activated elaboratively during online comprehension.  
In sum, earlier theories have made contrasting predictions about whether gender 
stereotypes are activated elaboratively during discourse comprehension. The use of 
the visual world eye-tracking method turned out to be a fruitful method to disentangle 
elaborative activation from later integration and to demonstrate that gender 
stereotypes are indeed activated elaboratively; a hypothesis that had not been resolved 
with previously used methods. 
General Discussion 
 69
Activation of implicit causality. Just as the visual world eye-tracking paradigm 
was used to examine gender stereotypes, it was also used in Study II to demonstrate 
elaborative activation of implicit causality information related to interpersonal verbs 
(e.g., frighten/fear). Shortly following the verb, implicit causality biases of the verbs 
affected people’s eye movements: Following the NP1-biased verbs such as frighten 
the probability of fixating the NP1 (the subject) was higher than after NP2-biased 
verbs. Similarly, the fixations toward the object were affected by the verb bias: 
Following the NP2-biased verbs such as fear the probability of fixating the NP2 (the 
object) was higher than after NP1-biased verbs. 
This finding supports the hypothesis derived from the Immediate Focusing 
Account (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; MacDonald & 
MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 2007) that implicit 
causality is activated prior to the pronoun. This account predicts early effects of 
implicit causality bias during pronoun resolution: it is argued that the effect of 
implicit causality at the pronoun is possible because implicit causality information is 
quickly inferred and used to highlight one entity over another. This highlighted entity 
is therefore immediately interpreted as the antecedent for the following pronoun. 
Although the focusing account does not clearly specify how early the activation of the 
bias-consistent discourse referent is, it suggests that the activation may occur even 
prior to the pronoun. Such early activation has not been shown in earlier studies - 
again, partly due to methodological limitations. However, Study II showed that 
implicit causality is indeed activated before the pronoun is heard.  
Interestingly, implicit causality became activated even prior to the causal 
conjunction because, which suggests that such activation is not dependent on any 
explicit prompts from the discourse, not even a causal conjunction as proposed by 
Stevenson et al., (1994, 2000). Instead, elaborative activation of implicit causality is 
due to the verb itself and does not require any additional prompts (see also McDonald 
& MacWhinney, 1995, for a similar hypothesis). 
Similar to the activation of gender stereotypes, elaborative activation of implicit 
causality can also be explained with Mental Models Theory. This theory does not 
strictly limit the type of semantic factors that can be activated elaboratively but 
instead allows both propositional meanings inherent in the discourse as well as 
meanings derived from the mental representations that people have created on the 
basis of events described in the text (Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998) to be used in discourse comprehension. Although the origin of the 
implicit causality bias is not clear, it is possible that such a bias is learned via prior 
exposure: The probability of encountering a continuation referring to NP1 or NP2 
following verbs such as frighten and fear might have created such a bias. Regardless 
of the ultimate basis for such a bias, these models assume activation of this bias as 
soon as the verb is encountered in the discourse. Recent mental simulation accounts 
suggest that encountering such a verb leads to a mental simulation of the event 
(Zwaan & Madden, 2004; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006; see also Fischer & Zwaan, 2008 




4.1.2 Semantics in backward inferencing 
The importance of semantics in backward inferencing and anaphor resolution was 
also examined in the present thesis. All experiments investigated some aspects of this 
question. The studies consistently showed that semantics plays an important role in 
backward inferencing: Study II showed an implicit causality effect during pronoun 
resolution, Study III showed an effect of proto-roles during children’s pronoun 
resolution, Study IV showed that semantics has a more prominent role in anaphor 
resolution than during non-anaphoric backward inferencing, and finally, Study I 
showed that gender stereotype information is used to revise an earlier drawn 
inference. 
Implicit causality and protoroles in pronoun resolution. Study II showed that 
implicit causality is used as a cue in pronoun resolution and its timing showed that it 
was used prior to the clausal integration phase. Therefore, these findings are difficult 
to explain in the framework of the Clausal Integration Account, which states that 
implicit causality is only activated and used in pronoun resolution in the phase when 
the explicitly stated causal information of the subclause is integrated with the 
causality implied in the main clause  (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et al., 1996; Stewart 
et al., 2000). Instead, the finding seems to fit better with the Immediate Focusing 
Account, which assumes that implicit causality is activated early and used early 
during pronoun resolution (Greene & McKoon, 1995; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 
2006; MacDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; McKoon et al., 1993; Van Berkum et al., 
2007). 
As noted earlier, the focusing account also assumes that because implicit causality 
is activated early and used to highlight one of the characters over another, this 
highlighted character has a privileged role to be interpreted as the antecedent. This 
assumption also implies that when the pronoun is ambiguous, the character that has 
become prominent by the focusing function of implicit causality would immediately 
become interpreted as an antecedent (Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; Van Berkum 
et al., 2007). However, the findings of Study II did not support this assumption. 
Instead, when a topic shift was introduced in the discourse prior to the pronoun, it 
made people more likely to shift their attention to the first-mentioned subject after 
hearing the pronoun irrespective of the implicit causality bias of the verb. This 
preference temporally masked the effect of implicit causality information on pronoun 
resolution. Earlier studies have shown that a topic shift makes the shifted topic highly 
focused and prominent in the discourse and at the same time also suppresses 
information from the preceding sentence, leading to a reduced activation of the non-
topical character (Bestgen & Vonk, 2000; Vonk et al., 1992). It seems that a topic 
shift masks the effect of implicit causality during the early phases of pronoun 
resolution. Importantly, this masking is temporary; an implicit causality effect was 
found again 900 ms following the pronoun onset, thus suggesting that implicit 
causality contributed to pronoun resolution well before the clause-final integration 
process proposed by the Clausal Integration Account (Garnham, 2001; Garnham et 
al., 1996; Stewart et al., 2000). 
Study III established an effect of semantics in children’s pronoun resolution as 
well. This study included verbs that differed in the degree to which their subject and 
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object exhibited proto-role properties of agents and patients, respectively. In the case 
of high transitive verbs, the subject carried several prototypically agent-like properties 
while the object carried patient-like properties. In contrast, in the case of low-
transitive verbs, subjects exhibited only a few prototypically agent-like properties and 
patient hardly any patient-like properties. These linguistic properties affected 
children’s eye movement behaviour when they processed an ambiguous pronoun: 
There was a higher proportion of fixations toward both the agent and patient in the 
high transitivity condition compared to the low transitivity condition. Importantly 
also, while in the low transitivity condition the subject was fixated more often than 
the object, such a preference was not so strong in the high transitive condition. 
Instead, the results indicated that in the high transitive condition both the subject and 
object were considered (competing) antecedents for the pronoun.  
These findings were expected based on the Proto-Role Hypothesis stating that the 
more prototypical agent- and patient-like properties subject and object exhibit for a 
given verb, the more foregrounded they are in discourse and thus the more preferred 
they are as antecedents for a pronoun (Dowty, 1991; Hopper & Thompson, 1980; 
Kako, 2006). Interestingly, the transitivity effect arose prior to the effect of 
discourse/structural cues suggesting that children were faster to use semantic cues 
than structural cues when interpreting ambiguous pronouns in discourse. This leads to 
the question why structural cues were delayed relative to semantic cues in this study 
but not in the study of implicit causality. On first sight, these studies seemed to 
provide contradictory findings regarding the time course of the use of semantics as a 
cue. However, I believe that these findings may be due to the different strengths of 
the discourse/structural cues: In the study of implicit causality the shifted topic may 
have served as a stronger cue than the first-mentioned subject (and topic) in the study 
of proto-roles. In support of this assumption, Järvikivi, Van Gompel, and Hyönä 
(submitted) showed that implicit causality preceded structural cues when the first-
mentioned character was not the topic. Furthermore, the interaction between the 
grammatical role and pronoun type (subject vs. object pronoun) in Study II showed 
that the object antecedent was fixated more often than the subject pronoun following 
an object pronoun, while the subject was fixated only marginally more often than the 
object following a subject pronoun. Interestingly, this observed effect of structural 
parallelism (see also Chambers & Smyth, 1998; Smyth, 1994) occurred later than the 
main effect of implicit causality, suggesting that semantic cues are not delayed 
compared to the effect of structural parallelism. 
Taking all of these findings together, it seems that semantics has an important role 
in backward inferencing. However, the strength of semantic cues is dependent on the 
relative strength of other, here discourse/structural, cues. When the structural cues 
consist of a combination of cues that have been independently shown to be important 
in backward inferencing, semantic effects may be masked, whereas when the 
discourse/structural cues consist of a combination of fewer prominent cues, semantics 
can have an earlier effect than structural factors in pronoun resolution (see 4.1.3 for 
mapping of the prominence of discourse/structural cues). 
These findings are difficult to explain for the structurally motivated theories 
introduced in Chapter 1. Of these, Structure Building Theory as well as Centering 
Theory and Discourse Prominence Theory assume that pronouns are resolved by 
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using either order-of-mention or grammatical role information, or a combination of 
these cues (Gernsbacher, 1988; 1990; Gernsbacher & Hargreaves, 1989; Gordon et 
al., 1993; Gordon & Hendrick, 1997a,b, 1998). In addition, the Two-Stage Model 
proposed for example by Garrod and Sanford (1994) does allow semantic cues to 
contribute to pronoun resolution but only in the second stage of processing after 
structural cues are first identified and used (see also Garrod & Terras, 2000). Even 
though this approach explains the late use of implicit causality found in pronoun 
resolution in Study II, it is unclear how this approach would explain the finding that 
implicit causality was inferred even prior to the pronoun. In addition, this approach 
faces difficulties in explaining the effect of proto-roles that preceded that of structural 
cues in Study III, as well as other recent findings showing earlier effects of implicit 
causality than structural cues in sentences where the structural cues are not as 
prominent as in Study II (Järvikivi et al., submitted; Koornneef & Van Berkum, 2006; 
Van Berkum et al., 2007). 
Gender stereotypes during anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences. In the 
previous literature on inferences it has been suggested that because anaphors are 
explicit markers for coherence building, drawing anaphoric inferences might differ 
from non-anaphoric inferences (Clark & Haviland, 1977; Garrod, Freudenthal, & 
Boyle, 1994; Garrod et al., 1990; Greene et al., 1992; Fincher-Kiefer, 1995). Study IV 
confirmed this hypothesis by showing that the relative importance of semantics 
compared to discourse/structural cues was different for these two types of processes. 
While gender stereotypes played a prominent role in anaphoric inferencing, during 
non-anaphoric bridging inferences were more strongly affected by 
discourse/structural factors. 
As was noted earlier, gender stereotypes have been shown to be important cues in 
pronoun resolution (Duffy & Keir, 2004; Kennison & Trofe, 2003; Kreiner et al., 
2008; Osterhout et al., 1997; Sturt, 2003a,b). Study IV of the present thesis replicated 
this finding. However, even more importantly, it showed that this cue was more 
prominent during anaphoric than non-anaphoric inferencing. In addition, the study 
showed that discourse/structural salience cues were more prominent during non-
anaphoric than anaphoric inferencing. The study suggests that an explicit marker, for 
example, an anaphoric expression, prompts an active search for a semantically most 
plausible antecedent, whereas when such a marker is absent, people rely more on 
discourse/structural cues. Although the previous studies had not established clear 
prominence for discourse/structural cues in anaphoric inferencing, it was expected 
based on an assumption that it is easier to make a bridging inference between two 
discourse elements when the earlier element is easier to retrieve given that 
structurally salient discourse entities are easier to retrieve than less salient entities 
(e.g., McKoon et al, 1993, 1996; O’Brien et al., 1990; 1995). 
Study IV adds an important aspect to the relative importance of semantics when 
compared to discourse/structural cues. In this study the relative importance of 
semantics was shown to be dependent on the type of inference drawn. Altogether, 
these findings suggest that the relative importance of semantics compared to 
discourse/structural cues is dependent on the strength of the structural cues and also 
on the type of inference, and thus, it is reasonable to capture both aspects in the 
models of inference generation. 
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Gender stereotypes and additional backward inferences. One hypothesis 
concerning the importance of semantics drawn from the Minimalist Account was 
tested in Study I. According to the Minimalist Account, only a minimal number of 
inferences are drawn in discourse in order to achieve a coherent interpretation 
(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992). Based on this assumption, it was 
hypothesised that if an anaphoric expression is ambiguous, a discourse/structural cue 
would be enough to satisfy the comprehender and a coherent interpretation is 
established by using this cue. Discourse/structural cues were again combined in order 
to introduce a structurally highly preferred antecedent for a verb phrase anaphor. The 
results showed that this cue was used to resolve the anaphoric expression. However, 
when listeners later encountered a gender stereotype role name, the visual attention 
shifted toward the stereotypically consistent character – irrespective of whether that 
character was the structurally preferred character or not. This finding suggests that 
comprehenders may not limit the number of inferences drawn in discourse. Instead, 
information such as gender stereotypes invites new, additional, inferences in the 
discourse. This finding goes against the Minimalist Account of inference generation 
in discourse comprehension (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1988, 1992). However, the 
finding can be explained in Mental Models theories, which allows updating of 
discourse interpretation every time comprehenders encounter new information in the 
discourse (Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). 
Taking all of the findings demonstrating the importance of semantics during 
forward and backward inferencing together, it seems that the Mental Model theories 
(Garnham, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) provide the most 
suitable theoretical framework to explain inference generation in discourse as well as 
the use and importance of semantics in these processes. However, as noted in the 
Introduction, this approach is the most flexible of the existing theories, as it allows 
several types of information to be used as cues in making forward inferences. 
Although this approach seems generally well suited to explaining inference 
generation in discourse, the relative importance of semantics compared to 
discourse/structural cues should be specified more explicitly in these models. I will 
return to this issue in Section 4.2, where I will propose alternative extensions to these 
models. Before that, I briefly discuss the discourse/structural findings obtained in the 
present studies. 
 
4.1.3 Discourse/Structural cues in backward inferencing  
Although the use of discourse or structural cues such as order-of-mention, 
grammatical role and topicality was not the main topic of the thesis, the studies also 
provided converging evidence for the use of these cues during adult and child 
pronoun resolution as well as during anaphoric and non-anaphoric inferences. 
Study II showed an interaction between structural cues and implicit causality in 
pronoun resolution. The interaction indicated that the effect of implicit causality was 
more pronounced for the subject than object antecedent (for similar findings, see e.g., 
McDonald & MacWhinney, 1995; Stewart & Gosselin, 2000; cf., Long & DeLey, 
2000, for an opposite observation). Stewart and Gosselin (2000) noted that it may 
General Discussion 
 74
well be that the first-mentioned preference exerts an additive effect so that it becomes 
easier to detect implicit causality effects with the first-mentioned character than the 
second mentioned character: The NP1 preference for NP1-biased verbs might thus be 
a combination of implicit causality and order-of-mention cues. As noted in Study II, 
the first-mentioned subject was also a shifted topic, making that particular character 
even more salient and thus a preferred antecedent for the pronoun (Bestgen & Vonk, 
2000; Vonk et al., 1992). Therefore, it is highly probable that the interaction between 
structural cues and implicit causality was partly observed because of such a strong 
discourse/structural cue. Nevertheless, the interaction showed that implicit causality 
does not operate independently but in collaboration with structural information. 
The earlier findings about the use of discourse/structural cues in children’s 
pronoun resolution have turned out to be controversial as well. While Song and 
Fischer (2005, 2007) established a first-mentioned subject preference even with 2-
year old children, Arnold et al. (2005, 2007) failed to show the same with 4-year old 
children. In the former study, the fact that the first-mentioned subject was repeated at 
least twice before the pronoun might have added to its salience, and thus contributed 
to the observed effects. In Study III the first-mentioned subject (and topic) was 
mentioned only once, but it was nevertheless found to be a significant cue in pronoun 
resolution. This finding provides further evidence for the use of discourse/structural 
cues in pronoun resolution with children as young as 3 years old. 
In addition, a comparison of the discourse/structural cues in Studies II and III 
indicates that different factors might contribute to the strength of structural cues: The 
structurally salient character in Study III was a combination of the three 
discourse/structural factors introduced in the Introduction: they were first-mentioned 
characters, grammatical subjects and also linguistic topics of the sentence. However, 
in Study II the structurally salient character was not only a combination of these three 
factors, but it was also a shifted topic. Thus, it could be argued that the structural cues 
were even stronger in Study II than in Study III. As discussed above, such shifting 
may not only affect the salience or prominence of the focused entity but also operates 
by suppressing information in the earlier discourse (Bestgen & Vonk, 2000; Vonk et 
al., 1992). This leads to the less-salient entity being even less salient than it would be 
without a topic shift. Therefore, the structurally preferred antecedent has become even 
more preferred by a topic shift. Such strengthening of the structural cues might be the 
reason why the implicit causality effect was masked during early phases of anaphor 
resolution. 
Finally, Study IV showed an interesting interaction between discourse/structural 
factors and the type of expression. While gender stereotype information had a 
prominent role during anaphor resolution, discourse/structural cues were more 
prominent when drawing non-anaphoric inferences. This finding indicates that effects 
of structural cues are dependent on the type of referring expression itself (see also 




4.2 Extending the Mental Models accounts 
As noted earlier, the Mental Model theories seem like a fruitful framework to 
explain inference generation and the role of semantics in discourse processing. In 
what follows, I sketch two potential models formed by extending the current models 
in order to explain the findings of the present thesis. These models are not intended to 
be exhaustive descriptions of inference generation in discourse, but instead are 
intended to form a basis for future studies needed to make comparisons between the 
proposed models and to suggest further modifications to them. The main difference 
between these models lies in the interactional nature of discourse/structural factors 
and semantic factors in forward inferencing: while Mental Model I does not assume 
such a link, Mental Model II does so. 
 
4.2.1 Mental Model I 
Mental Model I, depicted in Figure 10, describes the sequences of discourse 
processing and aims to explain what types of inferential processes are operating 
simultaneously during the course of processing. The highlighted colour represents a 
processing sequence that refers to processes that are occuring in the current context 
(Context N), whereas the preceding and the subsequent sequences are shadowed. The 
upper part of the figure illustrates the processes involved in backward inferencing, 
and the lower part of the figure illustrates the processes involved in forward 
inferencing. During both types of processes, semantic and discourse/structural cues 
are represented as separate boxes, and the arrows represent causal relations during the 
course of processing. 
In any given sequence of processing (Context N) both backward and forward 
inferences are drawn simultaneously as indicated by the arrows. Even though Context 
N may refer to a unit consisting of more than one word, the current studies suggest 
that the processor updates the inferences incorporated in the mental model at each and 
every word. This is also supported by the finding of an additional inference in Study 
IV: gender stereotype information was used to revise the initial inference even though 
that would not have been absolutely necessary in order to build a coherent 
interpretation. Therefore, the model assumes an extreme version of processing 
incrementality. 
Another reason why the model is highly incremental is because it assumes 
continuous drawing of forward inferences. The processor works in an optimal way by 
simultaneously drawing backward and forward inferences. As in the earlier Mental 
Model theories, this model does not restrict the type of forward inferences drawn: it 
assumes that both elaborative activation as well as detailed predictions of upcoming 







Figure 10. An illustration of the processing sequence postulated by Mental Model I. 
 
An important feature of this model is the assumed interactive nature between 
discourse/structural and semantic factors in backward inferencing. As shown in Study 
II and III, semantic cues were weighed in relation to the discourse/structural cues. 
When the relative strength of the discourse/structural cues was high, as in Study II, 
the semantic effects were masked early in the integration phase, whereas when the 
relative strength of the discourse/structural cues was lower, as in Study III8, semantic 
factors contributed to pronoun resolution earlier than discourse/structural cues.  
However, the interactional nature between discourse/structural cues and semantic 
cues was not tested in forward inferencing, and thus this model does not assume 
interactions between these cues during forward inferencing. The underlying idea is 
that discourse/structural cues provide independent cues to draw forward inferences – 
either elaborative activation of information or predictions of the upcoming events (see 
also the Introduction). One example of structural predictions would be for example 
predictions made based on low level features, for example, the use of transitional 
probability between adjacent words to predict upcoming words in the discourse (e.g., 
McDonald & Shillcock, 2003). Similarly, it is assumed that the semantic content 
directly invites forward inferences without interacting with discourse/structural 
                                                           
8 While the latter study included a first-mentioned subject that was also the linguistic topic, the 
former study added topic shift as a further manipulation.  
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factors. Based on the current studies it cannot be concluded whether this hypothesis 
of independent effects of semantics and discourse/structural cues (without interaction) 
is correct or whether these two types of cues interact with each other in forward 
inferencing. The latter possibility is incorporated in Mental Model 2.  
It should be noted here that because these models are not intended as exhaustive 
explanations of inference generation, discourse and structural factors are mapped as 
one group of cues and just roughly separated from the semantic cues. Even though 
discourse/structural cues are combined together, the model does not assume that they 
behave as one unified component and that the effects of the individual structural 
factors (order-of-mention, grammatical role, topicality, etc.) cannot be determined 
independently. In other words, the various structural factors can operate separately 
and can have different independent weights (see e.g., Järvikivi et al., 2005, for 
evidence that grammatical role and order-of-mention operate independently in 
pronoun resolution). Therefore, further studies are needed in order to resolve whether 
different discourse/structural factors are always operating separately or in interaction 
with each other. The earlier literature suggests that topicality is inherently part of 
either subjecthood (as in English, e.g., Lambrecht, 1994) or the first-mentioned entity 
(as in Finnish, e.g., Vilkuna, 1989). 
Similarly, all semantic factors are combined into one single category. However, 
the model does not assume that all semantic factors contribute to the same extent to 
inference generation. Interestingly, the present studies investigating three types of 
semantic information, gender stereotypes, implicit causality and proto-roles, seem to 
provide converging evidence for the use of semantics in both forward and backward 
inferences: gender stereotypes and implicit causality seemed to become activated 
elaboratively, while all three semantic features exhibited an important role in 
backward inferencing. In the present thesis the elaborative activation of proto-role 
properties was not tested; whether they are activated elaboratively is an interesting 
question to be studied in the future. 
In addition, the model also includes a direct link both via semantic and 
discourse/structural factors from the current Context (Context N) to Context N-1. This 
was added to the model as it is not clear whether there is always an interaction 
between discourse/structural and semantic factors in backward inferencing or whether 
they could also operate independent of one another. It may be that interactions 
between discourse/structural and semantic cues are only found in highly competitive 
contexts, as was the case with ambiguous anaphor resolution in the current studies. 
This is another interesting question for future studies to resolve. 
Finally, the model does not make explicit predictions about the timing of the 
effects, i.e., whether discourse/structural cues always precede semantic cues or vice 
versa. Instead, the relative importance of one type of cue over another is assumed to 
be resolved in the interactional link in backward inferencing. As Studies II and III 
showed, when more structural cues converge, they together have a very early effect 
and temporarily mask semantic cues (Study II) while when the structural cues are less 
prominent, semantic cues play a faster role in pronoun resolution (Study III). 
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4.2.2 Mental Model 2  
Mental Model 2, depicted in Figure 11, is a modified version of Mental Model I 
with only one modification: Mental Model 2 assumes an interactional link between 
discourse/structural factors and semantic factors in forward inferencing (the red 
arrows in Figure 11). Mental Model 1 did not assume such a link, but instead assumed 
that discourse/structural and semantic cues independently affected inferences. This 
link was added in the second model as it may well be that discourse/structural cues 
and semantic cues first interact with each other before, based on their relative 
strengths, forward inferences are made. The assumption here is that not all possible 
inferences become activated in a forward fashion, but only those that are confirmed 
by the interactional link. For example, semantic inferences might receive more 
activation if they are also supported by discourse/structural factors and vice versa. 
However, when the discourse/structural factors are pointing to another type of 
inference than semantic factors, it may be that only either of these inferences becomes 
activated (based on the weights of these cues) or neither of them becomes activated. 
Again, the current studies were not designed to test this hypothesis, but because this 
link plays a key role in selecting between Model 1 and Model 2, studies should be 
planned to test whether this link exists or not. 
 
 




One feature that should also be discussed here is the relative importance of 
semantic cues compared to discourse/structural cues. However, as noted earlier, the 
strength of the semantic cues might be dependent on the strength of the 
discourse/structural cues (as was shown in studies II and III). The current studies did 
not find any obvious difference in the strength of different semantic cues; instead, all 
semantic cues which were studied played an important role, but their relative strength 
was not tested by pitting them against each other. The current studies did not show 
that semantic cues are subordinate to discourse/structural cues. Interestingly, Study 
IV showed that different prompts for backward inferences (anaphoric vs. non-
anaphoric) led to differing strength of the semantic and structural cues. Therefore, 
future modelling will benefit from studies testing different types of prompts and the 
relative importance of discourse/structural cues as well as different aspects of 
semantics in making inferences following different prompts.  
In addition, both of the above models are descriptions of inferential processes that 
occur isolated from other sensory input. As current research on situated language 
comprehension suggests, other cues, such as the visual environment simultaneously 
present with the language input, may play an important role in language 
comprehension (e.g., Crocker et al., in press; Altmann & Mirkovic, 2009). How this 
environment contributes to inference generation is considered in the following 
section.  
Before that, it should be noted that the same models can be used to make 
hypotheses about children’s inference generation. One interesting aspect of testing the 
same model with both adults and children is to study the developmental path of when 
different inferential processes are acquired during language development. Study III 
showed that (at least) one dimension of semantic information is available and used as 
early as at age 3. Further studies are needed to replicate these findings and investigate 
how other aspects of semantics affect inferencing in children. Importantly however, 
the current study implies that semantic effects are not subordinate to 
discourse/structural factors; instead, semantic effects are weighed in relation to 
structural factors. As noted earlier, when structural factors were a combination of 
first-mentioned entity, grammatical subject and linguistic topic, semantics was 
operating earlier in pronoun resolution (Study III). In contrast, in adult Study II, 
where there was also a topic shift, the structural effects masked the semantic effect 
during early phases of pronoun resolution. These findings suggest that in backward 
inferencing the strengths of individual semantic and discourse/structural cues are 
weighted in relation to the interaction between semantic and structural factors. 
Moreover, the study with children showed that such weighting may be functional 
even in young children, although further studies are needed to confirm this 
assumption.  
 
4.3 The Situated Mental Model of inferences – future directions 
As is typical for scientific research, the current thesis has led to many open 
questions to be tackled in future research. Some of those have already been specified 
above when putting forth the two alternative models of inference generation. One 
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question that can be asked when using the visual world method is what role the visual 
environment plays in inference generation. As argued in Chapter 2, in the current 
studies the visual information was carefully selected not to give any obvious cues on 
what kind of inferences to draw and what kinds of cues to use in the inferential 
processes. However, the active role of visual environment should not be ignored in 
theories of inference generation.  
Earlier studies suggest that visual scenes play an important or even major role 
when predicting upcoming arguments in situated language comprehension (Altmann 
& Kamide, 1999, 2007, 2009; Kamide et al., 2003; Knoeferle & Crocker, 2006, 2007; 
Knoeferle et al., 2005). Therefore, the earlier view of language comprehension as an 
amodal process has been replaced by assumptions that language comprehension 
occurs as an active interaction between cues and constraints from the surrounding 
sensory environment and that the visual environment has an important role in 
incremental language comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan & Madden, 2004). 
For example, Altmann and Kamide (1999) showed participants visual scenes 
depicting pictures of a boy, a cake, a tractor and other objects. While participants 
were viewing the scene they heard sentences such as (36) and (37) in English. 
 
 (36) The boy will eat the cake.  
 (37) The boy will move the cake. 
 
The eye movements to the visual scene showed that participants made saccades 
toward the cake after the verb eat (36) even before the cake was mentioned in the 
spoken stimuli. However, no such preference was present after the verb move in (37). 
The results indicated that verbs such as eat set constraints for the potential upcoming 
arguments, i.e., it must be something edible, and when the visual scene provides 
information that fulfils those constraints, people are able to predict the upcoming 
arguments. However, it is also worth noting that such predictions of the upcoming 
words can be made without the co-presence of visual stimuli if the linguistic context 
is sufficiently constraining (e.g., DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2000; Otten & Van Berkum, 2008; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwiterlood, 
Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005).  
Interestingly, Knoeferle and Crocker (2006) also found that a visual scene may 
temporarily even override general world knowledge in language comprehension. 
While participants were listening to German sentences such as (38) they saw visual 
scenes depicting three characters, a pilot in the middle, a detective on one side of the 
pilot and a magician on the other side. The scene also showed actions and rather 
unusually depicted a magician spying on a detective (as typically the detective is 
spying on people). 
 
(38) Den Piloten bespitzelt gleich der Detecktiv.  




When participants heard the word bespitzelt (‘spy-on’), they quickly started to 
fixate the magician, as it was the one that was performing the action of the screen. 
However, in the experiment in which only characters, and not actions, were depicted 
on the scene, participants started to fixate the detective after hearing the verb 
bespitzelt. These results showed that when the visual scene does not provide cues on 
who-is-doing-what-to-whom, people rely on their general world knowledge; however, 
when visual scene does provide cues, those cues can be (temporarily) even stronger 
than cues arising from the general world knowledge. These studies suggest that 
visually depicted objects and actions affect on-line language comprehension.  
Based on Mental Model 1 introduced earlier, I propose a model of situated 
inference generation; Situated Mental Model 1 is depicted in Figure 12. The 
important questions here are what kinds of inferences the visual environment can 
prompt people to draw and how different cues interact with each other during 
inference generation. Situated Mental Model 1 includes a separate subcomponent for 
processing visual information (as one type of sensory input). The model assumes that 
this component interacts with discourse/structural and semantic factors during 
backward inferencing. However, only one interactional link is assumed for forward 
activation: an interaction between visual information and semantic factors. This link 
is proposed here based on the above findings that visual information is used to 
constrain semantically derived predictions during language comprehension: For 
example, in the Altmann and Kamide (1999) study, the visual information was used 
to constraint the scope of predictions for the verb eat. However, similarly to Mental 
Model 1, this model lacks an interactional link between discourse/structural and 
semantic factors. In addition, an interactional link between discourse/structural factors 




Figure 12. An illustration of the processing sequence postulated by Situated Mental 
Model 1 (a restricted interaction model).9 
 
Similarly to Mental Model 2, a version of the Situated Mental Model can be 
formed in which more interactional links are assumed in forward inferencing. 
Situated Mental Model 2 is depicted in Figure 13 as an example of a fully interactive 
model. This model assumes that there are interactional links between visual 
information, discourse/structural factors and semantic factors in both backward and 
forward inferencing. Thus, it assumes that forward inference generation is not only a 
result of separate processes pertaining to visual, discourse/structural and semantic 
cues or to an interactional link between visual information and semantics, but rather 
interactions are also assumed to occur between discourse/structural factors and visual 
information. Thus, inferences are drawn based on the relative strength of these 
individual cues in combination.   
 
                                                           
9 This illustration differs from the mental models presented above in Chapters 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, 
in that (in the interest of visual clarity) only the nodes from the currently operating sequence 





Figure 13. An illustration of the processing sequence postulated by Situated Mental 
Model 2 (a fully interactive model). 
 
 
In order to select between the suggested models, a set of studies should be carried 
out in the future. Disentangling the role of visual environment in inference generation 
and interactions between different types of information (visual and linguistic) are 
questions that I expect will attract a lot of attention in future studies. Moreover, it is 
likely that the proposed models are able to only roughly capture inferential processes 
and that significant modifications are needed. For example, it may be that the 
proposed interactional links operate only between certain types of visual information 
and certain types of semantic information, or between certain types of visual 





The present thesis investigated the importance of semantics in generating 
inferences during discourse processing: whether semantics is activated elaboratively 
during discourse comprehension and what its relative importance is in backward 
inferencing compared to discourse/structural cues. The earlier literature has provided 
several hypotheses concerning my research questions; however, the question has 
remained largely unresolved partly due to limitations in the previously used methods. 
By using the visual world eye-tracking method I showed that semantics plays an 
important role in both backward and forward inferencing: Gender stereotypes and 
implicit causality information are activated elaboratively during online discourse 
comprehension. Moreover, gender stereotypes, implicit causality and proto-role 
properties of verbs are all used in backward inferencing. Importantly, the studies 
demonstrated that the importance of semantic cues is modulated by the presence of 
discourse/structural cues. When the structural cues consist of a combination of cues 
that have been independently shown to be important in backward inferencing, 
semantic effects may be masked, whereas when the structural cues consist of a 
combination of fewer prominent cues, semantics can have an earlier effect than 
structural factors in pronoun resolution. In addition, the type of inference matters, too: 
During anaphoric inferences semantics plays a prominent role, while 
discourse/structural salience attains more prominence during non-anaphoric 
inferences. Finally, semantics exhibits a strong role in triggering new inferences to 
revise inferences made earlier even in the case that an additional inference is not 
needed to establish coherence in discourse. 
Although the findings are mainly in line with the Mental Model theories, not all of 
the above aspects are implemented in these models. Therefore, I proposed two extended 
models, Mental Model 1 and 2, which incorporate the current findings as well as 
findings in the earlier literature. These models allow both forward and backward 
inferencing to occur at any given moment during the course of processing and also 
allow semantic and discourse/structural cues to contribute to both of these processes. 
The difference between these two models is that while the former does not assume 
interaction between semantic and discourse/structural factors in forward inferencing, 
the latter does so. Further research is needed in order to select between these models. In 
addition, the current thesis also raised questions of the role of the visual environment 
during inference generation; thus, I sketched two alternative situated mental models as a 
basis for future research. They differ in the amount of interaction that is assumed to take 
place between semantic, discourse/structural and visual information.  
Finally, in the present thesis the visual world eye-tracking method proved to be an 
ideal tool for studying both forward and backward inferences, and importantly, to 
disentangle forward activation from backward integration. In addition, the thesis 
showed the method can be successfully used in both adult and child language studies 
of inferencing. This method is already gained a lot of popularity in language 
comprehension research, and I assume it will become a very attractive method to be 
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